Background

Economic theory of vertical restraints

Economic theory and competition law

Should distributors have more protection?

Vertical restraints put to the test of economic analysis

Structure of distribution law - Book plan

General bibliography

Introduction

Localizing the anticompetitive effects

Effect on trade between Member States

Scope ratione loci

Concept of an undertaking

Intra-group agreements

Scope ratione personae

Applicability of competition law to vertical agreements

Definition of the relevant market

Anticompetitive object or effect

Appreciability threshold

Concept of agreement and concerted practice

Prohibition of vertical restraints

Block exemptions

Individual exemptions and rule of reason

Exemption of vertical restraints

Control of vertical restraints

Prohibition

Exoneration

Restrictive agreements

Principle

Applications

Abuse of dominant position

Exclusive purchase/Exclusive supply

Resale outside network

International agreement

Exclusive distribution agreements

Manufacturer's guarantee

Protection of the brand

Protecting the network against third parties

Relations between the parties

Selective distribution

Hardcore restrictions

Individual exemptions

Rule of reason

Prohibition of restrictive agreements and individual exemptions

Distribution of new motor vehicles : Regulation No 330/2010

After-sales : Regulation No 461/2010

Block exemption

Motor vehicle distribution agreements

Merger control

Franchising

Commercial agency and competition

EU harmonization

International agency

Commercial agents

This book provides a wide-ranging review of the European rules relating to distribution: exclusive purchase and exclusive supply, exclusive and selective distribution, motor vehicle distribution, franchises, commercial agents.

European Distribution Law

Article 101(1) TFEU prohibits agreements for which “the object or effect” is to restrict competition. The alternative, i.e. object or effect, has a twofold significance and is interpreted both procedurally and substantively. Firstly, from the procedural point of view, it is not necessary for the supervisory authorities to wait for a restrictive action to have produced its effect to trigger the pro …

Dual significance

Article 101(1) TFEU prohibits agreements for which “the object or effect” is to restrict competition. The alternative, i.e. object or effect, has a twofold significance and is interpreted both procedurally and substantively. Firstly, from the procedural point of view, it is not necessary for the supervisory authorities to wait for a restrictive action to have produced its effect to trigger the prohibition, and the rule applies regardless of the nature of the practice at issue. In certain cases, it can have a specific meaning: some practices, classified as “restrictions by object”, are judged so anticompetitive that they justify a per se, i.e. automatic, prohibition. Consequently, it is irrelevant whether the cartel leads to concrete effects and whether any assessment of those effects is undertaken : exemptions are in principle ruled out . EU case-law traditionally found that price fixing  or market allocation agreements  fall under that category  which is not too far removed from the per se rules applicable in US antitrust law. Vertical agreements can also give rise to restrictions by object .The behavior of the parties to the agreement is thus of little importance: the fact that they did not expressly concur on the level of published prices, did not adhere to the agreement or that they withdrew from the agreement before its implementation  has no relevance to the anticompetitive nature of the practice. The De Minimis Notice  has enshrined the case law on infringements by object, providing that neither restrictions by object nor the hardcore restrictions set out in the block exemption regulations come within its scope of application.

For price-fixing agreements, see: Case T-144/89 Cockerill-Sambre (SA) [1995] ECR II-947, LawLex200400003653JBJ; Commission Decision No 98/247 of 21 January 1998, Alloy surcharge, LawLex200500004749JBJ; Case T-45/98 Krupp Thyssen Stainless GmbH [2001] ECR II-3757, LawLex200400003567JBJ; Case T-16/99 Lögstör Rör (GmbH) [2002] ECR  II-1633, LawLex200500004886JBJ. For market sharing agreements, see: Commission Decision No 78/163 of 20 December 1977, The Distillers Company Limited, Conditions of Sale and Price Terms, LawLex200400002397JBJ; Commission Decision No 87/409 of 13 July 1987, Sandoz, LawLex200400002441JBJ; Case C-277/87 Sandoz Prodotti Farmaceutici v Commission [1990] ECR I-45, LawLex200500004637JBJ; Commission Decision No 91/298 of 19 December 1990, Solvay / CFK, Soda ash, LawLex200500004574JBJ; Commission Decision No 91/532 of 5 June 1991, Viho/Toshiba, LawLex200400002468JBJ; Commission Decision No 92/262 of 1 April 1992, French-West African shipowners' committees, LawLex200400002904JBJ; Commission Decision No 92/426 of 15 July 1992, Viho/Parker Pen, LawLex200500004685JBJ; Case C-89/85 Ahlström Osakeyhtiö United Paper Mills (Ltd) [1993] ECR I-1307, LawLex200500004628JBJ; Case T-66/92 Herlitz v Commission [1994] ECR II-531, LawLex200400003559JBJ; Case T-143/89  Ferriere Nord (SpA) [1995] ECR II-917, LawLex200400003650JBJ; Case T-176/95 Accinauto v Commission [1999] ECR II-1635, LawLex200400003598JBJ: measures or agreements aimed at prohibiting or limiting exports; Case T-175/95 BASF v Commission [1999], ECR II-1581, LawLex200400003599JBJ; Case T-62/98 Volkswagen v Commission [2000] ECR II-2707, LawLex200400003580JBJ; Commission Decision No 2001/146 of 20 September 2000, Opel, LawLex200500004721JBJ: establishment of a bonus system and exerting of pressure on dealers to stop exports; Commission Decision No 2003/5 of 13 December 2000, Soda ash/Solvay, CFK, LawLex200500003892JBJ; Commission Decision No 2001/791 of 8 May 2001, Glaxo Wellcome (SA), Aseprofar et Fedifar, Spain Pharma, EAEPC, LawLex200400002669JBJ; Commission Decision No 2001/716 of 18 July 2001, SAS/Maersk Air - Sun-Air v SAS and Maersk Air, LawLex200500004672JBJ; Commission Decision No 2002/759 of 5 December 2001, Luxembourg Brewers, LawLex200400003555JBJ: agreements to freeze the respective market share of the participants in order to hinder the entry of foreign competitors to the market; Commission Decision No 2004/206 of 17 December 2002, Food flavour enhancers, LawLex200400003526JBJ, an analysis of the actual competitive effects is carried out merely for the sake of completeness of the assessment; Case T-50/00 Dalmine SpA [2004] ECR II-2395, LawLex200500004777JBJ: agreements constituting a cartel.

Commission Decision No 97/123 of 4 December 1996, Novalliance/Systemform, LawLex200500004768JBJ.

Commission Decision No 74/634 of 29 November 1974, Franco-Japanese ballbearings agreement, LawLex200400003282JBJ; Case T-141/89 Tréfileurope Sales (SARL) [1995] ECR II-791, LawLex200400003654JBJ; Case T-143/89 Ferriere Nord [1995] ECR II-917, LawLex200400003650JBJ: intention to align prices, notably penetration rebates, in order to limit imports; Case T-144/89 Cockerill-Sambre (SA) [1995] ECR II-947, LawLex200400003653JBJ; Commission Decision No 97/123 of 4 December 1996, Novalliance/Systemform, LawLex200500004768JBJ: monitoring by the supplier of resale prices and rebates to the end consumer; Commission Decision No 98/247 of 21 January 1998, Alloy surcharge, LawLex200500004749JBJ; Case T-45/98 Krupp Thyssen Stainless GmbH [2001] ECR II-3757, LawLex200400003567JBJ; Case T-16/99 Lögstör Rör (GmbH) [2002], LawLex200500004886JBJ; Case T-213/00 CMA CGM and others [2003] ECR II-913, LawLex200400003543JBJ: agreement between competing shipping companies to prohibit discounts on published rates for charges and surcharges for the same route; Commission Decision No 2005/566 of 9 December 2004, Choline Chloride, LawLex200700001304JBJ.

Case T-25/95 Cimenteries CBR (SA) [2000] ECR II-491, LawLex200400003586JBJ, for an exchange of information with the object of allocating markets; Commission Decision No 2001/791 of 8 May 2001, Glaxo Wellcome (SA), Aseprofar et Fedifar, Spain Pharma, EAEPC, LawLex200400002669JBJ; Commission Decision No 2002/759 of 5 December 2001, Luxembourg Brewers,  LawLex200400003555JBJ; Commission Decision No 2004/206 of 17 December 2002, Food flavour enhancers, LawLex200400003526JBJ; Case T-30/05 William Prym GmbH & Co KG [2007], ECR II-107, Summ.pub.

Even if the result - an automatic prohibition of a behavior - is similar, the method differs: the American per se rule, which is a example of the application of the rule of reason, requires a negative substantive assessment, whereas a restriction by object is a prior classfication which triggers the implementation of the prohibition. 

Case T-67/01 JCB Service v Commission [2004] ECR II-49, LawLex200500004797JBJ; Case C-439/09 Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique SAS, Judgment of 13 October 2011, LawLex201200000028JBJ; Case C-32/11 Allianz Hungária Biztosító Zrt, Judgment of 14 March 2013, LawLex201300000361JBJ.

Case T-213/00 CMA CGM, Judgment of 19 March 2003, LawLex200400003543JBJ, Commission Decision No 2006-902 of 21 December 2005, LawLex200700000392JBJ, Rubber chemicals.

Commission Communication 2014/C 291/01 Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

European Distribution Law

26. Dual significance

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Les décisions de justice citées dans ce paragraphe :

Sous parties

Les notions juridiques connexes

26. Dual significance

Demandez un accès gratuit au contenu exclusif Livv – juristes d’entreprise

Les décisions de justice citées dans ce paragraphe :

Sous parties

Les notions juridiques connexes

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au contenu exclusif Livv – juristes d’entreprise