Background

Economic theory of vertical restraints

Economic theory and competition law

Should distributors have more protection?

Vertical restraints put to the test of economic analysis

Structure of distribution law - Book plan

General bibliography

Introduction

Localizing the anticompetitive effects

Effect on trade between Member States

Scope ratione loci

Concept of an undertaking

Intra-group agreements

Scope ratione personae

Applicability of competition law to vertical agreements

Definition of the relevant market

Anticompetitive object or effect

Appreciability threshold

Concept of agreement and concerted practice

Prohibition of vertical restraints

Block exemptions

Individual exemptions and rule of reason

Exemption of vertical restraints

Control of vertical restraints

Prohibition

Exoneration

Restrictive agreements

Principle

Applications

Abuse of dominant position

Exclusive purchase/Exclusive supply

Resale outside network

International agreement

Exclusive distribution agreements

Manufacturer's guarantee

Protection of the brand

Protecting the network against third parties

Relations between the parties

Selective distribution

Hardcore restrictions

Individual exemptions

Rule of reason

Prohibition of restrictive agreements and individual exemptions

Distribution of new motor vehicles : Regulation No 330/2010

After-sales : Regulation No 461/2010

Block exemption

Motor vehicle distribution agreements

Merger control

Franchising

Commercial agency and competition

EU harmonization

International agency

Commercial agents

This book provides a wide-ranging review of the European rules relating to distribution: exclusive purchase and exclusive supply, exclusive and selective distribution, motor vehicle distribution, franchises, commercial agents.

European Distribution Law

An agreement may only qualify for an exemption on condition that it “[allows] consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit”. That requirement means that the contribution to economic progress should not be assessed uniquely from the point of view of the undertakings involved, but must also take into account the effects of the agreement relative to the demand from final consumers .
The efficiency …

Benefits reserved for the user

An agreement may only qualify for an exemption on condition that it “[allows] consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit”. That requirement means that the contribution to economic progress should not be assessed uniquely from the point of view of the undertakings involved, but must also take into account the effects of the agreement relative to the demand from final consumers .

The efficiency gains must fully offset the likely negative impact on prices, output and other relevant factors caused by the agreement . Improving conditions of distribution , providing better information to consumers , the creation of an after-sales service or a reduction in delivery deadlines  can also be taken into consideration. The benefit to consumer requirement within the meaning of Article 101(3) TFEU may still be fulfilled even though not all the members of the relevant category of consumers reap the benefit of the disputed practice , or if the beneficial effects are felt in Member States other than the one in which the parties to the agreement are established .

The greater the restriction to competition, the bigger the efficiency gains and their repercussions on consumers must be. The mere finding of competitive pressure on the relevant market  leads the supervisory authorities to conclude that the parties to the agreement may not retain for themselves all the derived benefit from that agreement. The agreement would however not be regarded as providing an adequate advantage to users if it resulted in a total elimination of price competition, even where competition in terms of the service provided is maintained . In such cases, the consumer effectively no longer has the choice between purchasing the product at the lowest price and purchasing it at a higher price with the service included. Where a restrictive agreement is likely to lead to higher prices, the Commission's view is that consumers must be fully compensated through an improvement in quality .

Commission Decision No 83/560 of 16 November 1983, Distribution system of Ford Werke AG, LawLex200400002425JBJ.

Guidelines on Vertical Restraints of 2022, at pt 294.

Case T-131/99 Shaw and Falla v Commission [2002] ECR II-2023, LawLex200500004881JBJ: exemption for a beer supply contract containing exclusive purchasing and non-compete obligations where subsequent improvements in the distribution outweigh any discrimination in the price borne by the distributor.

Commission Decision No 75/73 of 13 December 1974, Bayerische Motoren Werke AG, LawLex200700001839JBJ.

Case 26/76 Metro v Commission [1977] ECR1875, LawLex200400002802JBJ; Commission Decision No 83/672 of 21 December 1983, SABA's EEC distribution system, LawLex200500004100JBJ; Case 75/84 Metro v Commission [1986] ECR 3021, LawLex200500004031JBJ.

Case T-131/99 Shaw and Falla v Commission [2002] ECR II-2023, LawLex200500004881JBJ: an overall impact suffices.

Case C-360/92 P Publishers Association v Commission [1995] ECR I-23, LawLex200500005143JBJ.

See, inter alia, Case 26/76 Metro v Commission [1977] ECR 1875, LawLex200400002980JBJ.

See Case 26/76 Metro v Commission [1977] ECR 1875, LawLex200400002980JBJ. 

Commission Notice No 2004/C 101/08 of 27 April 2004, on the application of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty [now Article 101(3)] pt 86.

European Distribution Law

44. Benefits reserved for the user

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Les décisions de justice citées dans ce paragraphe :

Les notions juridiques connexes

44. Benefits reserved for the user

Demandez un accès gratuit au contenu exclusif Livv – juristes d’entreprise

Les décisions de justice citées dans ce paragraphe :

Les notions juridiques connexes

Demandez un accès gratuit
au contenu exclusif Livv – juristes d’entreprise