Background

Economic theory of vertical restraints

Economic theory and competition law

Should distributors have more protection?

Vertical restraints put to the test of economic analysis

Structure of distribution law - Book plan

General bibliography

Introduction

Localizing the anticompetitive effects

Effect on trade between Member States

Scope ratione loci

Concept of an undertaking

Intra-group agreements

Scope ratione personae

Applicability of competition law to vertical agreements

Definition of the relevant market

Anticompetitive object or effect

Appreciability threshold

Concept of agreement and concerted practice

Prohibition of vertical restraints

Block exemptions

Individual exemptions and rule of reason

Exemption of vertical restraints

Control of vertical restraints

Prohibition

Exoneration

Restrictive agreements

Principle

Applications

Abuse of dominant position

Exclusive purchase/Exclusive supply

Resale outside network

International agreement

Exclusive distribution agreements

Manufacturer's guarantee

Protection of the brand

Protecting the network against third parties

Relations between the parties

Selective distribution

Hardcore restrictions

Individual exemptions

Rule of reason

Prohibition of restrictive agreements and individual exemptions

Distribution of new motor vehicles : Regulation No 330/2010

After-sales : Regulation No 461/2010

Block exemption

Motor vehicle distribution agreements

Merger control

Franchising

Commercial agency and competition

EU harmonization

International agency

Commercial agents

This book provides a wide-ranging review of the European rules relating to distribution: exclusive purchase and exclusive supply, exclusive and selective distribution, motor vehicle distribution, franchises, commercial agents.

European Distribution Law

The cumulative effect theory consists in assessing the effects of an agreement with regard to the cumulated effects of similar agreements existing on the same market. An exclusive purchase agreement, which in itself does not appreciably affect trade between Member States, may be penalized where it contributes significantly to the cumulative market foreclosure effect resulting from a bundle of agre …

Cumulative effect theory

The cumulative effect theory consists in assessing the effects of an agreement with regard to the cumulated effects of similar agreements existing on the same market. An exclusive purchase agreement, which in itself does not appreciably affect trade between Member States, may be penalized where it contributes significantly to the cumulative market foreclosure effect resulting from a bundle of agreements existing on the same market .

The control authorities first check if there are any real concrete possibilities of access and take into account the number and size of operators present as well as the level of market saturation and customer loyalty to existing brands . The Guidelines on Vertical Restraints emphasize the risk from the presence on the market of major buyers having entered into exclusive supply agreements with the majority of the suppliers leading to market foreclosure for potential entrants .

In order to assess whether the contribution to the cumulative effect is significant, the competition authorities base themselves, inter alia, on the duration of exclusive purchase agreements; if the duration is excessive in relation to the average duration of agreements usually concluded on the market concerned, the agreement in question will be caught by Article 101 TFEU . 

Case T-7/93 Langnese-Iglo v Commission [1995] ECR II-1533, LawLex200400003648JBJ; Case T-9/93 Schöller v Commission [1995] ECR II-1611, LawLex200400003649JBJ; Commission Decision No 98/531 of 11 March 1998, Van den Bergh Foods Limited, LawLex200400002932JBJ.

See especially Case C-234/89 Delimitis v Henninger Bräu [1991] ECR I-935, LawLex200500003931JBJ; Case T-25/99 Roberts v Commission [2001] ECR II-1881, LawLex200500005164JBJ; Case T-65/98 Van den Bergh Foods v Commission [2003] ECR II-4653, LawLex200400003524JBJ.

Guidelines on Vertical Restraints of 2022, at pt 325. 

Case C-214/99 Neste Markkinointi (Oy) v Yötuuli (Ky) [2000] ECR I-11121, LawLex200500004917JBJ; Case T-25/99 Roberts [2001] ECR II-1881, LawLex200500005164JBJ; Case C-384/13 Estación de Servicio Pozuelo 4 SL, Order of 4 December 2014, not available in English.

European Distribution Law

51. Cumulative effect theory

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Les décisions de justice citées dans ce paragraphe :

Les notions juridiques connexes

51. Cumulative effect theory

Demandez un accès gratuit au contenu exclusif Livv – juristes d’entreprise

Les décisions de justice citées dans ce paragraphe :

Les notions juridiques connexes

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au contenu exclusif Livv – juristes d’entreprise