Global Competition Law is primarly a practitioner's guide presenting the most salient aspects of the major competition laws country by country, giving an overview of their structure and most charasteristic elements.
Global Competition Law also provides insight into possible future developments in the field.

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Where the CCCS has made a decision finding an infringement of Sections 34 or 47, it may give such directions as it considers appropriate to bring such infringement to an end (Section 69 of the Act). In this respect, the CCCS is not limited to giving directions to the infringing parties. Therefore, directions may be addressed to a parent company which, though not the actual instigator of the infrin …

Cease and desist orders

Where the CCCS has made a decision finding an infringement of Sections 34 or 47, it may give such directions as it considers appropriate to bring such infringement to an end (Section 69 of the Act). In this respect, the CCCS is not limited to giving directions to the infringing parties. Therefore, directions may be addressed to a parent company which, though not the actual instigator of the infringement, has a subsidiary which is the immediate party to the infringement. Directions may in particular require the person concerned to modify the agreement or conduct, or to terminate the agreement or cease the conduct in question. Directions may require positive action, such as informing third parties that an infringement has been brought to an end and reporting back periodically to the CCCS on certain matters. In some circumstances, the directions appropriate to bring an infringement to an end may include requiring an undertaking to make structural changes to its business. The CCCS may seek enforcement of its directions before the District Court. However, appeals against directions must be lodged before the Competition Appeal Board (for further details on directions, practitioners should refer to the former CCS's Guidelines on Enforcement of November 2016).

Under Section 69 of the Act, the amount of the financial penalty to be imposed may not exceed 10% of the turnover of the business of the undertaking in Singapore for each year of infringement, up to a maximum of 3 years. A fine may only be imposed if the CCCS is satisfied that the infringement has been committed intentionally or negligently.

Under the CCCS's Guidelines of November 2016 on the appropriate amount of penalty, a fine imposed by the CCCS will be calculated following a six-step approach: (i) calculation of the basic penalty having regard to the seriousness of the infringement (expressed as a percentage rate) and the turnover of the business of the undertaking in Singapore for the relevant product and relevant geographic markets affected by the infringement in the undertaking’s last business year (in this context, an undertaking’s last business year is the financial year preceding the year when the infringement ended); (ii) adjustment for the duration of the infringement; (iii) adjustment for other relevant factors, e.g. deterrent value; (iv) adjustment for aggravating or mitigating factors; (v) adjustment if the statutory maximum penalty under Section 69(4) of the Act is exceeded; and (vi) adjustment for immunity, leniency reductions and/or fast-track procedure discounts.

In 2018 the CCCS issued its biggest cartel fine to date (S$26.95 million (approx. US$20.12  million)) to 13 distributors of fresh chicken for  price fixing and agreeing not to compete during a seven-year period. 

Fines

Although Section 61 does not contain express provision of a leniency program, the CCCS administers it for undertakings which came forward with evidence of cartel activities. To qualify for total immunity, the undertaking must (i) be the first to provide the CCCS with evidence regarding the cartel activity before an investigation has commenced, provided that the CCCS does not already have sufficient information to establish the existence of the alleged cartel activity; (ii) provide the CCCS with all the information, documents and evidence available to it regarding the cartel activity immediately (such information must provide the CCCS with sufficient basis to commence an investigation); (iii) grant an appropriate waiver of confidentiality to the CCCS in respect of any jurisdiction where the applicant has also applied for leniency or any other regulatory authority for which it has informed of the conduct; (iv) unconditionally admit to the conduct for which leniency is sought and detail the extent to which it had an impact in Singapore by preventing, restricting or distorting competition within Singapore; (v) maintain continuous and complete cooperation throughout the investigation and until the conclusion of any action by the CCCS arising as a result of the investigation; and (vi) refrain from further participation in the cartel activity from the time of disclosure to the CCCS. If an undertaking does not qualify for total immunity, it may still benefit from a reduction in the financial penalty of up to 100%. A reduction of the fine of up to 100% is available only for the undertaking which is the first to come forward only after an investigation has commenced but before the CCCS has sufficient information to issue a written notice under Section 68(1) that it proposes to make a decision that the Section 34 prohibition has been infringed. Subsequent applicants may be granted a fine reduction of up to 50%. An undertaking which has initiated or coerced other undertakings to participate in the cartel is not eligible for total immunity or for a reduction in the financial penalty of up to 100% but may still apply for leniency and benefit from a reduction in the financial penalty of up to 50% subject to certain conditions (for further guidance on the conditions for being granted leniency and the procedure for leniency applications, practitioners should refer to the former CCS's Guidelines on lenient treatment for undertakings coming forward with information on cartel activity of November 2016).

As of January 2021, of the sixteen cartels infringement decisions issued, nine used the leniency program.

Global Competition Law

1229. Cease and desist orders

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Les notions juridiques connexes

1229. Cease and desist orders

Demandez un accès gratuit au contenu exclusif Livv – juristes d’entreprise

Les notions juridiques connexes

Demandez un accès gratuit
au contenu exclusif Livv – juristes d’entreprise