Global Competition Law is primarly a practitioner's guide presenting the most salient aspects of the major competition laws country by country, giving an overview of their structure and most charasteristic elements.
Global Competition Law also provides insight into possible future developments in the field.

Global Competition Law

Pursuant to Section 9, where the Board considers that there is an infringement of Sections 4, 6 or 7 “it shall inform the enterprise (...) concerned by a decision stating the conduct to be performed or avoided (...) in order to maintain conduct and reinstate the situation prior to the infringement.”
Since the 2020 amendments, the Board may impose either behavioral or structural remedies. However,  …

Cease and desist orders

Pursuant to Section 9, where the Board considers that there is an infringement of Sections 4, 6 or 7 “it shall inform the enterprise (...) concerned by a decision stating the conduct to be performed or avoided (...) in order to maintain conduct and reinstate the situation prior to the infringement.”

Since the 2020 amendments, the Board may impose either behavioral or structural remedies. However, structural remedies can only be imposed after behavioral remedies have failed to restore effective competition.  In addition, structural remedies must remain proportionate and necessary. 

Where an undertaking engages in anticompetitive conduct, fines of at least TRY 200 million (EUR 10.4 million) and up to 10% of their Turkish turnover in the previous financial year may be imposed. Employees of the undertakings involved may also be ordered to pay up to 5% of the undertaking's fine. The mimimum amount of the fine is set at TRY 31,903 (EUR 1668) for the year 2020. 

When determining the fine, the Board has to take into consideration factors, such as the injury suffered, the seriousness of fault, the market power of the undertaking involved, the duration of infringement and the role of each undertaking (for further details on the criteria used to determine the level of the fine, practitioners should refer to the Regulation on fines to apply in cases of agreements, concerted practices and decisions limiting competition, and abuse of dominant position).

The Competition Board has the authority to impose administrative fines and periodic penalties for supplying incorrect, misleading or absence of information in response to a request for information or an on-the-spot investigation or for infringing conditions attached to an exemption decision of TRY 100 million (EUR 5.3 million) (Section 16).

Fines

Under Section 16(6) of Act No 4054 fines may not be imposed on undertakings actively cooperating with the Competition Board and fine reductions may be granted in respect of the quality, efficiency and timing of the cooperation brought by undertakings which cannot claim immunity. In the interests of legal certainty for undertakings and the regulation of leniency proceedings, the Competition Board adopted a Leniency Regulation on 15 February 2009. The regulation details the rules applicable for leniency claims by both undertakings and their employees and management. The regulation was supplemented on 17 April 2013 by “Leniency Guidelines” which seek to provide certainty in respect of interpretation of the Leniency Regulation and guidance for undertakings in line with the principle of transparency. The guidelines concern the scope of the regulation, who may apply for leniency, immunity from fines, conditions for application, confidentiality and the submission of new information or evidence. They also give additional guidance on procedural aspects of leniency applications.

Under Section 4 of the regulation, the first undertaking to submit information and evidence and to meet certain requirements before the Competition Board decides to carry out a preliminary investigation, will be granted immunity from fines. This requires that no application has already been made by a manager or employee. Immunity may also be granted to an undertaking even where the Competition Board has already decided to carry out a preliminary investigation but prior to the notification of the investigation report where the Board does not have, at the time of submission, sufficient evidence to establish a violation of Article 4 of the Act. No application must have been previously made by another undertaking before the Board decides to launch an inspection, and no manager or employee have made an application to that end.

Section 5 of the regulation provides that the undertakings which submit information and evidence and meet certain conditions, after the decision of the Board to initiate a preliminary investigation and before the notification of the investigation report, but which cannot benefit from immunity shall benefit from reduction of fines. In this context, the fine in respect of the first undertaking is reduced by between a third and a  half; the fine imposed on the second undertaking is reduced by one-fourth to one-third; and the fines imposed on other undertakings are reduced by one-sixth to one-fourth. A fine reduction may be granted simultaneously to an undertaking and its management or employees.

To meet the requirements for both immunity and reduction of fines, the undertaking must:

a) submit information and evidence in respect of the alleged cartel including the products affected, the duration of the cartel, the names of the undertakings party to it, specific dates, locations and participants in cartel meetings,

b) not conceal or destroy information or evidence related to the alleged cartel,

c) end its involvement in the alleged cartel,

d) keep the application confidential until the end of the investigation, 

e) maintain active cooperation until the Board gives its final decision.

Finally, immunity (not reduction of fine) may not be granted where the undertaking concerned has acted as a coercer.

Sections 7 and 8 of the regulation detail similar rules for immunity or fine reduction for managers and employees of the concerned undertakings.

A new regulation came into force on 16 December 2023 (Regulation No. 32401). This concerns active cooperation in the detection of cartels ("New Leniency Regulation") and provides immunity from fines or reduction of fines for companies, entrepreneurs and employees who actively cooperate with the Turkish Competition Authority with the aim of uncovering cartels prohibited by Turkish competition law. The new regulation can be seen as aimed at eliminating the uncertainties in previous regulations, notably by introducing new concepts into the leniency mechanism, such as cartel facilitators, or harmonizing the leniency programme with EU legislation.  

Global Competition Law

1342. Cease and desist orders

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Les notions juridiques connexes

1342. Cease and desist orders

Demandez un accès gratuit au contenu exclusif Livv – juristes d’entreprise

Les notions juridiques connexes

Demandez un accès gratuit
au contenu exclusif Livv – juristes d’entreprise