Global Competition Law is primarly a practitioner's guide presenting the most salient aspects of the major competition laws country by country, giving an overview of their structure and most charasteristic elements.
Global Competition Law also provides insight into possible future developments in the field.

Global Competition Law

Violation of the prohibition on agreements restricting competition (Article 3(1)) or abusing a dominant position (Article 11(1)), is punishable by fines of up to CZK 10 million (EUR 381,677) or 10% of net turnover for the prior calendar year (Article 22a). The 2012 reform introduced a new paragraph 6 in Article 22b clearly specifying that the fine is transferred to the legal successor of the respo …

Fines and administrative sanctions

The Office is expressly empowered to prohibit the future performance of prohibited agreements (Article 7), and to prohibit continued abuse of a dominant position (Article 11(2)).

Cease and desist orders

Violation of the prohibition on agreements restricting competition (Article 3(1)) or abusing a dominant position (Article 11(1)), is punishable by fines of up to CZK 10 million (EUR 381,677) or 10% of net turnover for the prior calendar year (Article 22a). The 2012 reform introduced a new paragraph 6 in Article 22b clearly specifying that the fine is transferred to the legal successor of the responsible undertaking if it ceases to legally exist. The amended Act also included provisions under which members of bid-rigging cartels incurred a compulsory three-year ban on participating in public procurement procedures (new Article 22a (4) to(6)). However, cartel members could benefit from the immunity provided by the leniency programme (new Article 22ba(3)). The amendment brought by Act 293/2016 now gives discretion to the Office as to the opportunity of the ban and the duration thereof within the 3 year-long limit (new wording of Article 22a(4)). 

Intentional or negligent failure to provide requested information to the Office, or the communication of false information, is punishable by a fine of up to CZK 300,000 (EUR 11,450) or 1% of the net turnover achieved by the undertaking in the last accounting period. Since Amendment No. 226/2023, failure to provide business records on the CCA’s request within the specified timeframe or refusal to cooperate during a dawn raid may result in fines of up to 10% of the average daily net turnover (calculated on the previous accounting period). Fines may be imposed several times, depending on the company’s behavior.

Since December 2012, new Article 22aa provides that public authorities participating in a distorsion of competition incur a fine of up to CZK 10 million (EUR 381,677). Finally, failure to appear at a hearing or obstructing proceedings is likewise punishable by a fine of up to CZK 100,000 (EUR 3,816).

More generally, in cases of failure to pay the abovementioned fines, the Office may impose further “remedial measures”.

Heavily criticized for the lightness of the sanctions imposed on infringing undertakings, the Office realeased new fining guidelines in April 2018 which expose undertakings to much heavier fines. The guidelines still distinguish three categories of breaches, but the corresponding percentage of the value of sales has been increased. Less serious infringements now give rise to a basic amount of the fine of up to 5% of the undertaking's sales (compared to a maximum of 0,5% previously). Serious infringements incur a fine of 3 to 10% of the undertaking's sales (compared to a maximum of 1% previously). Very serious infringements are now sanctioned by a fine which basic amount is of 5 to 15% of the undertaking's sales (note that the 10% ceiling still applies). Under the new guidelines, mitigating or aggravating factors may still be taken into account to adjust the amount of the fine, but now they may lead to a decrease or an increase of up to 70% of the basic amount (compared to a maximum of 50% previously).

Amendment No. 226/2023 has introduced several changes: 

(i) Solidarity of companies within an undertaking. 

(ii) Liability within associations of undertakings : If an association of undertakings is fined, this fine can amount to 10% of the total net turnover of all its members during the last accounting period. Each member of the association is liable for paying up to 10% of their net turnover in the event of default paiement; members represented in the association’s decision-making body must pay first.

In 2001, the Office adopted a notice introducing a leniency program in order to discourage prohibited cartel practices. Leniency provides for total immunity from fines or for fine reduction of up to 50%. To bring enhanced legal certainty to undertakings, the 2012 reform included the program directly in the Competition Act (new Article 22ba), which led the Office to publish a revised notice on 4 November 2013.  

An undertaking that is the first to provide the Office with relevant information, documents, evidence, or witnesses on the existence of an agreement that infringes the Competition Act, and of which the Office was not aware and that justifies the initiating of on-site investigations, may be awarded immunity if four conditions are met: the undertaking must submit all the relevant information, documents and evidence available that prove the existence of a prohibited agreement; the undertaking admits its participation in the infringement; the undertaking must not have coerced other undertakings to join in the prohibited behavior; and the applicant actively cooperates with the Office in the course of the administrative proceedings.

Fine reduction of up to 50% may be obtained where an undertaking provides the Office with information with significant probative added-value, and meets the above-mentioned three last conditions.

The 2012 reform also amended the Criminal Code in order to specify that leniency extends to criminal sanctions (new Article 248a).

Amendment No. 226/2023 outlines regulations concerning the marker, ensuring a reserved spot for leniency applicants, and provides comprehensive guidelines for submitting concise leniency applications when whistleblowers seek immunity across multiple EU Member States. 

Moreover, the amendment expands leniency provisions to encompass all collusive agreements that aim to manipulate competition. This expansion permits leniency applications for reporting prohibited vertical agreements, indicating agreements between companies operating at varying levels of the production chain, and not solely limited to cartels.

Global Competition Law

154. Fines and administrative sanctions

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Les notions juridiques connexes

154. Fines and administrative sanctions

Demandez un accès gratuit au contenu exclusif Livv – juristes d’entreprise

Les notions juridiques connexes

Demandez un accès gratuit
au contenu exclusif Livv – juristes d’entreprise