Global Competition Law is primarly a practitioner's guide presenting the most salient aspects of the major competition laws country by country, giving an overview of their structure and most charasteristic elements.
Global Competition Law also provides insight into possible future developments in the field.

Global Competition Law

A violation of the prohibition on restrictive agreements or of the prohibition on abuse of a dominant position was, until 1 July 2016, punishable by a fine of not higher than EUR 450,000 or ten percent of the turnover of the undertaking or association of undertakings in the prior financial year dependent on which amount is higher (Section 57). In order to improve the deterrent effect of fines, ame …

Fines

In the context of an infringement of Section 6(1) or 24(1), Section 56 provides that the ACM may issue a binding instruction to comply with the Act or an order subject to periodic penalties.

Cease and desist orders

A violation of the prohibition on restrictive agreements or of the prohibition on abuse of a dominant position was, until 1 July 2016, punishable by a fine of not higher than EUR 450,000 or ten percent of the turnover of the undertaking or association of undertakings in the prior financial year dependent on which amount is higher (Section 57). In order to improve the deterrent effect of fines, amendments passed on 23 December 2015 and which entered into force on 1 July 2016 doubled the ceiling of the fine which now reaches EUR 900,000. The 10% ceiling may now be multiplied by the number of years during which the cartel was effective, with a maximum of four years, which means that the fine may reach up to 40% of the undertaking's annual turnover. Furthemore those amounts may be doubled in the case of repeat infringements within a period of five years.

Requirements for calculating turnover are now set out in Section 1.1 of the 2014 ACM Fining Policy Rule No WJZ/14112617 which also provides guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to statutory provisions. The Fining Policy Rule has been amended to reflect the changes brought in the ceiling of fines without altering the method of determination of the fine. Pursuant to Section 2.2, in determining the level of the fine, the ACM takes into account the seriousness of the violation, the circumstances in which the violation was committed and the duration of the violation. Pursuant to Section 2.4, the ACM sets a basic fine of between 0 and 50% of the undertaking's “relevant turnover”, which is composed of revenues from the supply of goods or services directly or indirectly related to the violation minus discounts and turnover tax. Mitigating and aggravating factors may decrease or increase the amount of the fine.

The Streamlining Act of June 2014 has removed the possibility for sanctioned undertakings to delay the payment of their fine until a decision is handed down on appeal. Since 1 August 2014, undertakings must pay the fine within a maximum of 24 weeks, whether or not they have appealed against the ACM's decision.

On 28 June 2002, the Competition Authority - now replaced by the ACM - adopted guidelines “in relation to the non-imposition or reduction of fines aimed at promoting the detection of cartels. Those guidelines are now replaced by the ACM Leniency Policy Rule No WJZ/14112586 of 4 July 2014 which entered into force on 1 August 2014. As under the previous rules, the undertaking which is the first to provide the ACM with information regarding the cartel which the ACM did not have prior to its disclosure, may apply for a fine immunity. However, under the new rules, an undertaking may now qualifiy for full immunity even if the ACM has already launched an investigation if it is the first to come forward with information on the basis of which the ACM is able to prove the existence of the cartel, before the ACM sends a Statement of Objections. Beforehand, in such situation, the undertaking could only apply for a 60-100% fine reduction. The new rules also increase the reduction ranges for the following undertakings coming forward with significant added value information: the second may receive a fine reduction of 30-50%, the third 20-30% and the rest up to 20%. Previously, any undertaking after the first to come forward would benefit from a reduction of between 10-40%. The Leniency Policy Rules define "information with significant added value” as evidence that, given its nature or level of detail, enhances the ability of ACM to prove the existence of the alleged cartel, taking into consideration the information that ACM has on that cartel at the time when such evidence is submitted.

To further encourage the denunciation of illegal behavior to the authorities, including competition law infringements, the Whistleblowers (Safe Haven) Act of 1 March 2016 introduced an obligation for undertakings employing more than 50 persons to set up internal reporting schemes. The Act entered into force on 1 July 2016.

Global Competition Law

749. Fines

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Les notions juridiques connexes

749. Fines

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Les notions juridiques connexes

Demandez un accès gratuit
au contenu exclusif Livv – juristes d’entreprise