Global Competition Law is primarly a practitioner's guide presenting the most salient aspects of the major competition laws country by country, giving an overview of their structure and most charasteristic elements.
Global Competition Law also provides insight into possible future developments in the field.

Global Competition Law

Article 51 of the Act governs the leniency programme before the Antimonopoly Office. Any applicant for leniency must fulfil the following conditions :
- it must end its involvement in an agreement restricting competition at the latest immediately after its application, unless the Office grants a derogation in order to preserve the effectiveness of the investigation into the cartel ;
- it must not  …

Leniency

Article 32 of the Act empowers the Office to impose on undertakings any remedy that is proportionate to the infringement and necessary to bring it to an effective end. The remedy may either be an obligation concerning the undertaking, an obligation to do something or to refrain from doing something, or it may concern a change in the undertaking’s structure.

The Office can impose several remedies at the same time, within a timeframe it determines.

Cease and desist orders

The Office may decide to impose either a final fine or a periodic penalty payment (Article 41). Fines may reach up to 10% of the worldwide turnover of the undertaking for each infringement. The same fine may also be imposed if the undertaking fails to comply with the decision of the Office (Article 42(1)). Likewise, the Act now allows the Office to impose a fine on an association of undertakings for an infringement committed by its members, up to 10% of the sum of the turnover of all its members active on the market affected by the infringement, it being specified that the financial liability of each member may not exceed 10% of its turnover (Article 43).

The amount of the fine takes into account the duration and gravity of the infringement, having regard to the nature of the conduct and its impact on the market, the size of the market, the existence of repeated infringements, the dominant position of the undertaking, and any refusal to cooperate (Article 42(3)). To provide further guidance, the Office has issued Guidelines on the procedure for determining fines in cases of abuse of dominant position and agreements restricting competition, effective as of 1 September 2018.

Fines of up to 1% of an undertaking’s turnover may also be imposed if it fails to fulfil the obligation to submit the requested documents or information to the Antimonopoly Office within the specified time limit, or submits false or incomplete documents (Article 44). The Office may also impose a periodic penalty of up to 5% of the average daily worldwide turnover in order to ensure compliance with its decisions (Article 46(1)).

Fines

Article 51 of the Act governs the leniency programme before the Antimonopoly Office. Any applicant for leniency must fulfil the following conditions :

- it must end its involvement in an agreement restricting competition at the latest immediately after its application, unless the Office grants a derogation in order to preserve the effectiveness of the investigation into the cartel ;

- it must not have coerced any undertaking into entering into the agreement restricting competition (this condition does not apply to partial leniency) ;

- it must fully cooperate and provide the Office with all evidence available, without undue delay and until the end of the proceedings ;

- it must not disclose its intention to apply for leniency nor its actual submission of the application until the statement of objections is issued by the Office.

Full immunity is granted to the first undertaking involved in an agreement restricting competition that, on its own initiative, provides the Office with either decisive evidence of the cartel or information crucial to carrying out an inspection in order to obtain such decisive evidence. Partial immunity — consisting of a reduction of the fine by up to 50% — is granted to the undertaking providing the Office with evidence with significant added value.

Detailed rules on submitting applications for the leniency programme, applications for marker reservations, the particulars of such applications, and the procedure followed by the Office may be found in Leniency Decree No. 172/2014 and in the Office’s Guidelines on the Application of the Leniency Programme.

A whistleblower procedure for individuals was introduced into national law in 2014. Article 54 of the Competition Act defines a whistleblower as a natural person who was the first to provide the Office with information regarding a cartel between competitors. Such information must constitute decisive evidence establishing the cartel, or justify inspections that will provide such decisive evidence. The reward for providing such information is set at 1% of the total amount of the fines imposed on all parties to the cartel in the decision of the Office, while being capped at EUR 100,000. It is not automatic and the whistleblower must submit a request to the Office. The reward is granted by an express decision of the Office.

Global Competition Law

642. Leniency

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Les notions juridiques connexes

642. Leniency

Demandez un accès gratuit au contenu exclusif Livv – juristes d’entreprise

Les notions juridiques connexes

Demandez un accès gratuit
au contenu exclusif Livv – juristes d’entreprise