CJEU, 5th chamber, October 12, 2023, No C-286/22

THE COURT (Fifth Chamber),

1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of point 1 of Article 1 of Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability (OJ 2009 L 263, p. 11).

2 The request has been made in proceedings between KBC Verzekeringen NV (‘KBC’) and P&V Verzekeringen CVBA (‘P&V’) concerning the potential right of an occupational accident insurer, which is subrogated to the rights of a cyclist who was riding an electric bicycle, to receive compensation from the civil liability insurer of the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident which led to the death of that cyclist.

Legal context

European Union law

3 Recital 2 of Directive 2009/103 states:

‘Insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles (motor insurance) is of special importance for European citizens …’

4 Under Article 1 of that directive, headed ‘Definitions’:

‘For the purposes of this Directive:

1. “vehicle” means any motor vehicle intended for travel on land and propelled by mechanical power, but not running on rails, and any trailer, whether or not coupled;

…’

5 Article 3 of that directive, entitled ‘Compulsory insurance of vehicles’, provides, in its first paragraph:

‘Each Member State shall … take all appropriate measures to ensure that civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles normally based in its territory is covered by insurance.’

6 Article 13 of that directive, entitled ‘Exclusion clauses’, provides, in paragraph 1:

‘Each Member State shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that any statutory provision or any contractual clause contained in an insurance policy issued in accordance with Article 3 shall be deemed to be void in respect of claims by third parties who have been victims of an accident where that statutory provision or contractual clause excludes from insurance the use or driving of vehicles by:

…

(b) persons who do not hold a licence permitting them to drive the vehicle concerned;

…’

7 On 24 November 2021, Directive (EU) 2021/2118 of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2009/103 (OJ 2021 L 430, p. 1) was adopted. Directive 2021/2118 amended, inter alia, point 1 of Article 1 of Directive 2009/103. In accordance with Article 2 of Directive 2021/2118, that amendment is to apply from 23 December 2023.

Belgian law

8 Article 1 of the wet betreffende de verplichte aansprakelijkheidsverzekering inzake motorrijtuigen (Law on compulsory insurance against civil liability in respect of motor vehicles), of 21 November 1989 (Belgisch Staatsblad, 8 December 1989, p. 20122), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings (‘the Law of 21 November 1989’), contains inter alia the following definition:

‘For the application of this law, the following definitions shall apply:

Motor vehicles: vehicles intended for travel on land and which may be propelled by mechanical power, but not running on rails; anything coupled to the vehicle is considered to be a part thereof.

Trailers constructed specifically to be coupled to a motor vehicle for the purpose of transporting persons or things and which are determined by royal decree shall be treated as motor vehicles. The means of transport falling within the scope of the definition of a motor vehicle may be specified by royal decree deliberated in the Council of Ministers.’

9 Article 29a of that law provides, in paragraphs 1 to 3:

‘1. In the event of a road traffic accident involving one or more motor vehicles, … apart from any material damage and damage suffered by the driver of any motor vehicle involved, all damage suffered by the victims and their successors in title which results from personal injury or death … shall be compensated jointly and severally by the insurers, which, in accordance with the present law, are to cover the liability of the owner, the driver or the keeper of those motor vehicles. This provision shall also apply if the damage was caused intentionally by the driver.

…

2. The driver of a motor vehicle and his or her successors in title cannot rely on the present article, unless the driver acts as the successor in title of a victim who was not the driver and on condition that he or she did not intentionally cause the damage.

3. Motor vehicle should be understood as meaning any vehicle referred to in Article 1 of the present law, with the exception of motorised wheelchairs that may be put into circulation by a disabled person.’

The dispute in the main proceedings and the question referred for a preliminary ruling

10 On 14 October 2017, BV (‘the victim’), who was riding an electric bicycle on a public road, was struck by a car insured by KBC under the Law of 21 November 1989. The victim was seriously injured and died on 11 April 2018. Since that accident constituted, for the victim, a ‘commuting accident’, P&V, his employer’s occupational accident insurer, paid compensation and was subrogated to the rights of the victim and those of his successors in title.

11 P&V brought an action against KBC before the politierechtbank West-Vlaanderen, afdeling Brugge (Police Court, West Flanders, Bruges Division, Belgium) seeking the reimbursement of its expenses on the basis of Article 1382 of the former Belgian Civil Code or of Article 29a of the Law of 21 November 1989. KBC lodged a counterclaim requesting that P&V be ordered to reimburse a sum which allegedly should not have been paid. In its defence, P&V argued, relying on that Article 29a, that the victim could not be regarded as having been the driver of a motor vehicle.

12 By judgment of 24 October 2019, that court found that the driver of the car concerned was not responsible for the accident in question, but that, under Article 29a, KBC was nevertheless required to compensate the victim and P&V, which was subrogated to the rights of that victim, on the ground that the victim was not the driver of a motor vehicle and that he was therefore entitled to compensation under that article.

13 KBC brought an appeal against that judgment before the rechtbank van eerste aanleg West-Vlaanderen, afdeling Brugge (Court of First Instance, Western Flanders, Bruges Division, Belgium). P&V lodged a cross-appeal.

14 By judgment of 20 May 2021, that court dismissed the main appeal and upheld the cross-appeal. As regards the application of Article 29a of the Law of 21 November 1989, it found, inter alia, that the concept of a ‘motor vehicle’, referred to in that article, corresponded to the concept of a ‘vehicle’, set out in point 1 of Article 1 of Directive 2009/103. Having found that the concept of ‘mechanical power’ was not defined in that law or in that directive, it considered that that concept was nevertheless explicit and that the terms ‘which may be propelled by mechanical power’ had to be understood as meaning that a motor vehicle is a vehicle capable of movement without muscular effort. It concluded from this that a bicycle is not a motor vehicle, within the meaning of that law, if it is equipped with an auxiliary motor but mechanical power cannot, by itself, start the bike’s movement or maintain its movement.

15 In the light of the information provided by the manufacturer of the electric bicycle in question, that court found that the motor with which that bicycle was equipped provided only pedal assistance, including the ‘boost’ function of that motor, and that this function could be activated only after the use of muscular power, whether by pedalling, by walking with the bicycle or by pushing it. It concluded from this that the victim was not the driver of a motor vehicle, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Law of 21 November 1989, and that he could claim compensation under Article 29a of that law as a ‘vulnerable road user’, as could the occupational accident insurer, which was subrogated to the rights of that victim.

16 KBC brought an appeal in cassation against the judgment mentioned in paragraph 14 above before the Hof van Cassatie (Court of Cassation, Belgium), the referring court. Before that court, KBC claims inter alia that the definition of the concept of a ‘motor vehicle’ set out in Article 1 of that law corresponds to the definition of the term ‘vehicle’ in point 1 of Article 1 of Directive 2009/103. It concludes from this that Belgian law must be interpreted in accordance with that directive.

17 On the substance, KBC submits that, since Article 1 of the Law of 21 November 1989 does not distinguish between vehicles intended for travel on land and which may be propelled exclusively by mechanical power, and those which may be propelled also by mechanical power, only those vehicles which are propelled exclusively by muscular power are excluded from the scope of that law. It therefore claims that the rechtbank van eerste aanleg West-Vlaanderen, afdeling Brugge (Court of First Instance, West Flanders, Bruges Division) misconstrued the concept of ‘motor vehicle’ and infringed Articles 1 and 29a of that law and, inter alia, point 1 of Article 1 of Directive 2009/103.

18 The referring court states that the resolution of the dispute before it requires an interpretation of the concept of a ‘vehicle’, within the meaning of point 1 of Article 1 of Directive 2009/103.

19 In those circumstances, the Hof van Cassatie (Court of Cassation) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘Is [point 1 of Article 1] of Directive [2009/103, as applicable prior to its amendment by Directive 2021/2118], which defines [the term] “vehicle” as “any motor vehicle intended for travel on land and propelled by mechanical power, but not running on rails, and any trailer, whether or not coupled”, [to] be interpreted as meaning that an electric bicycle (Speed-Pedelec) whose engine provides pedal assistance only, so that the bicycle does not move autonomously, without muscular power, but only by means of engine and muscular power, and an electric bicycle which is equipped with a boost function, whereby the bicycle accelerates to a speed of 20 km/h when the boost button is pressed without pedalling, yet muscular power is required in order to be able to use the boost function, are not vehicles within the meaning of [Directive 2009/103]?’

Admissibility of the request for a preliminary ruling

20 The German Government challenges the admissibility of the present request for a preliminary ruling on the ground that it does not explain why the requested interpretation of EU law is relevant for the resolution of the dispute in the main proceedings. In that government’s view, the dispute falls exclusively within the scope of national liability law, which has not been harmonised by EU law, and it does not appear from the case file that the provisions of EU law have been declared applicable by national law.

21 According to settled case-law, in the context of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation or the validity of a rule of EU law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (judgments of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others, C‑62/14, EU:C:2015:400, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited, and of 28 October 2020, Pegaso and Sistemi di Sicurezza, C‑521/18, EU:C:2020:867, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).

22 It follows that questions relating to EU law enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to give a ruling on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation, or the determination of validity, of a rule of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgments of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others, C‑62/14, EU:C:2015:400, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited, and of 28 October 2020, Pegaso and Sistemi di Sicurezza, C‑521/18, EU:C:2020:867, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

23 Moreover, it is true that the Court has repeatedly held that the obligation to provide insurance cover against civil liability for damage caused to third parties by motor vehicles is distinct from the extent of the compensation to be afforded to them on the basis of the civil liability of the insured person. Whereas the former is defined and guaranteed by EU legislation, the latter is, essentially, governed by national law (judgments of 23 October 2012, Marques Almeida, C‑300/10, EU:C:2012:656, paragraph 28, and of 30 March 2023, AR and Others (Direct action against the insurer), C‑618/21, EU:C:2023:278, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

24 Thus, EU legislation does not seek to harmonise the rules of the Member States governing civil liability and, as EU law currently stands, the Member States are free to determine the rules of civil liability applicable to road accidents (see, to that effect, judgments of 23 October 2012, Marques Almeida, C‑300/10, EU:C:2012:656, paragraph 29, and of 30 March 2023, AR and Others (Direct action against the insurer), C‑618/21, EU:C:2023:278, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

25 Consequently, as EU law currently stands, in relation to their civil liability insurance schemes, the Member States remain, in principle, free to determine, in particular, which damage caused by motor vehicles must be compensated, the extent of such compensation and the persons who are entitled to it (see, to that effect, judgments of 24 October 2013, Drozdovs, C‑277/12, EU:C:2013:685, paragraph 32, and of 30 March 2023, AR and Others (Direct action against the insurer), C‑618/21, EU:C:2023:278, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).

26 That being said, where, under the law of a Member State, in order to interpret a provision in a non-harmonised area, it is necessary to refer to a concept of EU law, it is clearly in the interest of the European Union that, in order to forestall future differences of interpretation, the concept taken from EU law should be interpreted uniformly, irrespective of the circumstances in which it is to be applied (see, by analogy, judgments of 24 October 2019, Belgische Staat, C‑469/18 and C‑470/18, EU:C:2019:895, paragraph 22, and of 27 April 2023, Banca A (Application of the Merger Directive in a domestic situation), C‑827/21, EU:C:2023:355, paragraph 44).

27 In the present case, the question referred for a preliminary ruling does not relate to the matters mentioned in paragraph 25 above. In particular, by that question, the referring court does not ask the Court whether a victim such as the victim in question in the main proceedings is entitled to compensation under Directive 2009/103, but rather questions the Court solely concerning the scope of the concept of a ‘vehicle’ in point 1 of Article 1 of that directive.

28 While the referring court’s explanations concerning the relationship between the applicable national law and that provision of Directive 2009/103 – a relationship which national courts are required to explain to the Court under Article 94(c) of its rules of procedure – are indeed succinct, the referring court nevertheless indicates, in its request for a preliminary ruling, that the resolution of the dispute before it depends upon the interpretation of that concept. In addition, it is clear from that request that, according to the referring court, the concept of ‘motor vehicles’ in Article 1 of the Law of 21 November 1989 corresponds to the concept of a ‘vehicle’ in point 1 of Article 1 of Directive 2009/103.

29 Furthermore, first, the Court has before it all the factual and legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the question submitted to it and, secondly, there is no doubt as to the reality of the dispute in the main proceeding and that that question is not hypothetical.

30 In those circumstances, the request for a preliminary ruling must be held to be admissible.

Consideration of the question referred

31 By its question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether point 1 of Article 1 of Directive 2009/103 must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of a ‘vehicle’, within the meaning of that provision, encompasses a bicycle whose electric motor provides pedal assistance only and which is equipped with a function allowing the bicycle to accelerate to a speed of 20 km/h without pedalling, a function which may however be activated only after the use of muscular power.

32 When interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part.

33 As regards the wording of point 1 of Article 1 of Directive 2009/103, it should be noted that that provision provides that, for the purposes of that directive, ‘vehicle’ refers to ‘any motor vehicle intended for travel on land and propelled by mechanical power, but not running on rails, and any trailer, whether or not coupled’. Accordingly, in accordance with the usual meaning of those words in everyday language, that concept, in so far as it refers to ‘any motor vehicle’, necessarily relates to a device designed in order to allow travel on land by means of power produced by a machine, as opposed to human or animal effort, with the exception of vehicles running on rails.

34 Although it thus follows from the wording of point 1 of Article 1 of Directive 2009/103 that the concept of a ‘vehicle’, within the meaning of that provision, encompasses only vehicles intended for travel on land which may be propelled by mechanical power, with the exception of vehicles running on rails, that wording is not sufficient, by itself, to provide an answer to the question referred, since it does not indicate whether such mechanical power must be exclusively responsible for the propulsion of the vehicle concerned.

35 The versions of that point 1 of Article 1 in, inter alia, the French, Italian, Dutch and Portuguese languages, in so far as they indicate that the vehicles concerned ‘may’ be propelled by mechanical power, could be read as meaning that the concept of ‘vehicles’, within the meaning of that provision, encompasses not only vehicles propelled exclusively by mechanical power, but also those which may be propelled by other means. However, in other language versions, in particular the Spanish, German, Greek, English and Lithuanian versions, that provision is drafted differently, such that it cannot be read in the same way.

36 According to settled case‑law, provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all the languages of the European Union. Where there is a divergence between the different language versions of a provision of EU law, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the general scheme and the purpose of the rules of which it forms part (judgments of 8 December 2005, Jyske Finans, C‑280/04, EU:C:2005:753, paragraph 31, and of 21 December 2021, Trapeza Peiraios, C‑243/20, EU:C:2021:1045, paragraph 32).

37 Thus, as regards the general scheme of Directive 2009/103, it should be noted, first, that according to recital 2 of that directive, the compulsory ‘insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles’ provided for in that directive refers to ‘motor insurance’, an expression which traditionally refers, in everyday language, to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of devices such as motorcycles, cars and trucks which, unless they are out of order, are propelled exclusively by means of mechanical power.

38 In addition, Article 13 of Directive 2009/103 specifies, in paragraph 1(b) thereof, that each Member State is to take all appropriate measures to ensure that any statutory provision or any contractual clause contained in an insurance policy issued in accordance with Article 3 is deemed to be void in respect of claims by third parties who have been victims of an accident where that statutory provision or contractual clause excludes from insurance the use or driving of vehicles by persons who do not hold a licence permitting them to drive the vehicle concerned. It follows from the wording of Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and Council of 20 December 2006 on driving licences (OJ 2006 L 403, p. 18), that, in principle, only the driving of vehicles capable of running under their own power, other than rail-borne vehicles, is subject to a national driving licence.

39 As regards the objectives pursued by Directive 2009/103, it should be noted that it is intended to ensure the free movement of vehicles normally based on EU territory and of persons travelling in those vehicles and to guarantee that the victims of accidents caused by those vehicles will receive comparable treatment irrespective of where in the European Union the accidents occurred, as well as ensuring the protection of victims of accidents caused by motor vehicles, that protection objective having been continuously pursued and reinforced by the EU legislature (see, to that effect, judgments of 20 June 2019, Línea Directa Aseguradora, C‑100/18, EU:C:2019:517, paragraphs 33, 34 and 46 and the case-law cited, and of 20 May 2021, K.S. (Costs of towing a damaged vehicle), C‑707/19, EU:C:2021:405, paragraph 27).

40 Devices which are not propelled exclusively by mechanical power and which therefore cannot travel on land without the use of muscular power, such as the electric bicycle at issue in the main proceedings, which, in addition, may accelerate to 20 km/h without pedalling, do not appear to be capable of causing bodily or material damage to third parties comparable, as regards gravity or scale, to the damage that may be caused by motorcycles, cars, trucks or other vehicles, travelling on land, propelled exclusively by mechanical power, which can reach speeds significantly higher than those that can be achieved by such devices, and which, at present, predominate on the road. The objective of protecting victims of road accidents caused by motor vehicles, pursued by Directive 2009/103, therefore does not require that such devices be covered by the concept of a ‘vehicle’, within the meaning of point 1 of Article 1 of that directive.

41 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred is that point 1 of Article 1 of Directive 2009/103 must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of a ‘vehicle’, within the meaning of that provision, does not encompass a bicycle whose electric motor provides pedal assistance only and which is equipped with a function allowing the bicycle to accelerate to a speed of 20 km/h without pedalling, a function which may however be activated only after the use of muscular power.

Costs

42 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

On those grounds, the Court (Fifth Chamber) hereby rules:

Point 1 of Article 1 of Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to ensure against such liability

must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of a ‘vehicle’, within the meaning of that provision, does not encompass a bicycle whose electric motor provides pedal assistance only and which is equipped with a function allowing the bicycle to accelerate to a speed of 20 km/h without pedalling, a function which may however be activated only after the use of muscular power.