French Competition Law provides a comprehensive review of the French rules relating to competition: restrictive agreements, commercial negotiation, abuses of a dominant position, procedure and merger control.

French Competition Law

The Competition Authority adjusts the basic amount of the fine taking into account any aggravating or mitigating circumstances and other objective factors relating to the situation of each undertaking or entity.

Among the main factors that can aggravate the amount of the fine are:

-- the undertaking's role as leader or initiator ,  or its specific role in the conception or implementation of the offense ;

- pressure on other undertakings to participate in the infringement or whether the undertaking has taken retaliatory measures ,

- if the undertaking's behavior is an example to others  notably in its position as dominant market leader ;

- the position of the undertaking on the market  due notably to its particular reputation , their status or special moral authority, particularly when they are entrusted with a public service mission , 

- the fact that it belongs to a large group  when it does not operate independently on the market , without it being necessary to explain how this affiliation played a role in the implementation of the practices ;

- the  economic power of the undertaking .

- the particularly anticompetitive nature of a practice ,

- the organized character and duration of the cartel ,

- the fact that the practice took place on an emerging market ,

- continuous participation in the collusive behavior ,

- the fact that the practice has been the subject of an earlier injunction ,

- knowledge of the unlawful nature of the practice .

Among the factors that may mitigate the fine are:

- the termination of the anticompetitive behavior as soon as the Competition Authority becomes involved ,  with the exception of secret agreements or practices such as cartels;

- undertaking victim of pressure to participate in the infringement  ;

- the actual cooperation of the undertaking with the Competition Authority, beyond the obligations to which it is legally bound and outside the scope of the leniency procedure ;

- the approval, solicitation or encouragement of the practice by the public authorities ;

- remedial measures implemented in the course of the proceedings with respect to the victims of the practice, including the payment of compensation due pursuant to a settlement within the meaning of Article 2044 of the Civil Code ;

- the specific procedures for public procurement and the limited number of suppliers ,

- the absence of or imprecise nature of regulations , or even the unprecedented nature of the practice ;

- the absence of effects  or negligible effect of the agreement ,

- the single-product nature of the undertaking , which is assessed, where applicable, at the level of the group to which it belongs , provided that the sales implemented by the other companies in the group, included in the calculation, are related to the infringement ; or at the level of several markets when the Competition Authority has imposed a single penalty for practices committed on several related markets ;

- whether the anticompetitive behavior is a result of the actions of a third party ,

- the role played by the undertaking or body that was the victim of the cartel ,

- the low level of involvement of the undertaking ;

The undertaking's lack of ability to contribute, which is assessed not only with regard to the situation of the subsidiary but also that of its parent company, in the absence of any autonomy on the part of the former vis-à-vis the latter , is not taken into account when the accounting and tax information it produces shows that its solvency and debt ratios enable it to cover the payment of the fine . Conversely, proof of a heavy level of net debt in relation to the EBITDA standard and a negative centralized cash position, as well as the launch of a warning procedure by the statutory commissioner, can establish the reality of difficulties affecting an undertaking's ability to pay, tempered by the existence of a high level of equity, and justify a reduction in the amount of the fine . The Competition Authority assesses the undertaking's financial difficulties on the day it issues its decision  and not when the practices were committed . Similarly, in the event of an appeal against the decision, the undertaking's or entity's ability to pay is assessed on the day of the court's decision, on the basis of information that the appellants are required to update .

The Competition Authority, which did not consider itself bound to reward undertakings for the implementation of a compliance program after the start of the procedure or where the undertaking has ceased participating in the infringement where such acts had no impact on earlier events  announced in the Notice of 19 October 2017 on settlement procedures and compliance programs that it would no longer grant fine reductions on those grounds, especially for particularly serious infringements such as agreements and exchanges of information on future prices and commercial policy . The fact that the sanctioned undertaking is a SME  or that it does not carry must-have brands is not an individual circumstance capable of justifying a reduction of the fine . This is also the case where the undertaking had no prior convictions against it  , is in a crisis situation  or did not make any profit from the infringement . Conversely, under the 2021 notice on the setting of fines, the illicit gains derived from the infringement justify an increase in the penalty when they exceed the amount of the fine incurred . Lastly, the existence of economic difficulties in the sector cannot justify a reduction of the fine .

CA Paris, 20 November 2014, LawLex201400001321JBJ; Competition Authority decision No 14-D-19 of 18 December 2014, LawLex201500001522JBJ; No 19-D-19 of 30 September 2019, LawLex201900001155JBJ; No 19-D-24 of 17 December 2019, LawLex201900001582JBJ; No 19-D-24 of 17 December 2019, LawLex201900001582JBJ; CA Paris, 15 October 2020, LawLex202000002566JBJ; 3 December 2020, LawLex202000003475JBJ; Competition Authority decision No 21-D-21 of 9 September 2021, LawLex202100005180JBJ; No 22-D-08 of 3 March 2022, LawLex202200001261JBJ; No 24-D-06 of 21 May 2024, LawLex202400004018JBJ; No 24-D-10 of 4 December 2024, LawLex202400009375JBJ.

Pt 38 of Notice of 30 July 2021. For examples , see CA Paris, 21 December 2017, LawLex201700002147JBJ, which emphasizes that the Competition Authority may increase the amount of the fine imposed on an undertaking which, without playing a role of leader or initiator, has taken an active role of persuasion of the other participants, even if  this is the first occurrence of such a sanction, provided that it demonstrates the effective exercise of that role; 6 October 2022, LawLex202200008326JBJ; 14 September 2023, LawLex202300011514JBJ; Competition Authority decision No. 23-D-15 of 29 December 2023, LawLex202400000233JBJ.

Competition Authority decision No 21-D-09 of 24 March 2021, LawLex202100000854JBJ; No 21-D-20 of 22 July 2021, LawLex202100004687JBJ; CA Paris, 16 November 2023, LawLex202300013688JBJ; Competition Authority decision No 24-D-09 of 29 October 2024, LawLex202400009005JBJ.But see Competition Authority decision No 19-D-11 of 29 May 2019, LawLex201900000718JBJ.

Competition Authority decision No. 16-D-17 of 21 July 2016, LawLex201600001358JBJ; No. 22-D-16 of 6 October 2022, LawLex202200009992JBJ.

CA Paris, 22 September 1993, LawLex200200002899JBJ; Competition Council decision No 93-D-39 of 5 October 1993, LawLex200200002437JBJ; No 93-D-42 of 19 October 1993, LawLex200200002459JBJ; CA Paris, 25 March 1997, LawLex200200002378JBJ; Competition Council decision No 97-D-68 of 23 September 1997, LawLex200300002239JBJ; CA Paris, 10 March 1998, LawLex200200002598JBJ; Cass. com., 10 March 1998, LawLex200200002930JBJ: on the particular seriousness of the boycott; Competition Council decision No 98-D-42 of 23 June 1998, LawLex200200002945JBJ, on public undertakings; CA Paris, 27 November 2001, LawLex200200002280JBJ, agreement affecting the price of a service paid for by consumers; Competition Council decision No 03-D-10 of 20 February 2003, LawLex200300001053JBJ, agreement relating to works concerning a public service.

CA Paris, 29 April 1993, LawLex200200003040JBJ; Competition Council decision No 93-D-39 of 5 October 1993, LawLex200200002437JBJ; CA Paris, 21 October 1997, LawLex200200003395JBJ; Competition Council decision No 02-D-57 of 19 September 2002, LawLex200200002141JBJ, upheld by CA Paris, 17 June 2003, LawLex200300002305JBJ, retaining the unjustifiable nature of the price cartel within the meaning of the OECD recommendation of 25 March 1998.

Competition Council decision No 98-D-53 of 8 July 1998, LawLex200200003187JBJ, Competition Authority decision No 09-D-14 of 25 March 2009, LawLex200900001122JBJ.

Competition Council decision No 93-D-39 of 5 October 1993, LawLex200200002437JBJ.

CA Paris, 11 January 2005, LawLex200500003797JBJ.

Competition Council decision No 01-D-46 of 23 July 2001, LawLex200200003367JBJ; CA Paris, 27 November 2001, LawLex200200002280JBJ; Cass. com., 27 September 2017, LawLex201700001550JBJ; Competition Authority decision No 22-D-02 of 13 January 2022, LawLex202200000248JBJ.

Mitigating circumstance introduced in 2021 notice on setting of fines at pt 37. See previously CA Paris, 20 December 2018, LawLex201800001990JBJ, requiring that the cessation of the offense be unsolicited. Finally, falling into line with the European approach which specifies that the ending of the infringement does not constitute a mitigating circumstance, all the more so when it occurs after the sending of the Statement of Objections and as the parties could not be in any doubt about the unlawful nature of their practices, see CA Paris, 4 July 2019, LawLex201900000898JBJ; Similarly. Competition Authority decision No 24-D-09 of 29 October 2024, LawLex202400009005JBJ, in which it was held that an undertaking which has made a strong commitment to reforming the system implemented, and which has tried on several occasions to convince the other participating undertakings to join in, may be entitled to a 20% reduction in the basic amount of the fine.

According to pt 37 of the 2021 sanctions notice, a maverick is someone who has persistently adopted competitive behavior, for a material part of the products or services concerned, to the point of having disrupted the very operation of the practice in question.  For illustrations, See CA Paris, 19 January 2010, LawLex201000000062JBJ; Competition Authority decision No. 15-D-03 of 11 March 2015, LawLex201500000341JBJ, cited above :an undertaking that has triggered a commercial conflict with other participants leading to a disruption of the agreement, the interruption of meetings and the mitigation of the effects of the infringement, even for a limited period ; CA Paris, 27 October 2016, LawLex201600001790JBJ, cited above,  the undertaking must demonstrate that it systematically thwarted the positions announced to its competitors; Competition Authority decision No 19-D-24 of 17 December 2019, LawLex201900001582JBJ, cited above. CA Paris, 1 July 2021, LawLex202100004330JBJ, holding that an undertaking which distances itself from the content of anticompetitive meetings and expresses its opposition to the practices implemented on various occasions, must be considered to have played a maverick role which justifies a reduction in the basic amount of the fine incurred; Cf. holding that a passive, follow-my-leader role alone does not justify a reduction in the fine, CA Paris, 20 November 2014, LawLex201400001321JBJ, cited above; CA Paris, July 4, 2019, LawLex201900000898JBJ, cited above,  specifying that the role of maverick played by an undertaking several years after the end of its participation in the restrictive agreement does not justify a reduction of the fine; 6 October 2022, LawLex202200008326JBJ, cited above, and 16 November 2023, LawLex202300013688JBJ, cited above, excluding the alleged role of maverick; Competition Authority decision No. 24-D-06 of 21 May 2024, LawLex202400004018JBJ, cited above, holding that an undertaking which engaged in maverick behavior on two sites cannot hope to obtain a reduction of the fine, since that behavior only concerned isolated events, given the scope and duration of the restrictive agreement, and only reflects a one-off or partial disregard for the common policy. In this case, the Authority also took the view that an undertaking which charged prices lower than those demanded by the members of the cartel could not claim a reduction of the fine, since those prices were the result of negotiations with buyers with strong bargaining power, and not of competitive zeal used to sabotage the cartel. On the other hand, a company that had maintained a significant degree of competitive behavior by charging low prices, to the point of irritating other participants, was able to obtain a 15% reduction in the amount of its fine.

Competition Council decision No 09-D-05 of 2 February 2009, LawLex200900000179JBJ, qualifying as an aggravating circumstance retaliatory measures taken against a former employee having alerted a competition authority of anticompetitive conduct.

CA Paris, 4 July 1996, LawLex200200002734JBJ. See also, conversely Competition Authority decision No. No 23-D-04 of 12 April 2023, LawLex202300005062JBJ, ruling that an undertaking cannot claim to have been in a situation of economic dependence vis-à-vis the other participant in the restrictive agreement, once it has actively adhered to the practices and participated in monitoring their implementation; No. 24-D-06 of 21 May 2024, LawLex202400004018JBJ, cited above, emphasizing that the pressure to which an undertaking claims to have been subjected is not sufficiently strong to justify a reduction in the amount of the fine, since it was not sufficient to dissuade it from subsequently leaving the cartel. Cf. Competition Authority decision No. 21-D-26 of 8 November 2021, LawLex202100005760JBJ, holding that there is no principle requiring that fines imposed on distributors implicated in a restrictive agreement be less severe than those imposed on suppliers. See also. Competition Authority decision No. 23-D-05 of 18 April 2023, LawLex202300005887JBJ, holding that a supplier cannot claim to have been forced to take part in a restrictive agreement by a dealer association which acts as a countervailing power to it, since it took part in all its meetings and expressed its assent.

Mitigating circumstance introduced in 2021 notice on setting of fines at pt 37. See, in an earlier case, Competition Authority decision No. 14-D-16 of 18 November 2014, LawLex201400001281JBJ, cited above, which considers that the undertaking's cooperation with the investigating authorities, which constitutes a legal obligation, cannot as such be considered a mitigating circumstance, all the more so when its manager merely affirmed to the investigators what they had discovered through their searches. See also Competition Authority decision No. 23-D-12 of 11 December 2023, LawLex202300014350JBJ, emphasizing that the proposal by the undertaking in question of new general sales conditions does not constitute an act of cooperation going beyond the obligations to which it is legally bound.

Mitigating circumstance introduced in 2021 notice on setting of fines at pt 37.

Competition Council decision No 00-D-29 of 5 July 2000, LawLex200200003144JBJ; Competition Authority decision No 12-D-26 of 20 December 2012, LawLex201200002487JBJ, which stresses that the specific national framework, characterized by the preservation of a regulation contrary to Union law, constitutes a mitigating circumstance. See also CA Paris, 24 September 2015, LawLex201500001244JBJ,  holding that although the application of the regulations relating to the two use-by dates in force at the time of the facts, which led to the same product being considered fit for consumption in overseas territories when it was not in mainland France, cannot justify the disparagement to which the complainant was subjected, this circumstance, which required the subsequent intervention of the legislator in order to put an end to it, is capable of reducing the amount of the penalty imposed. Cf. Cass. com., 30 May 2018, LawLex201800000813JBJ, holding that the perpetrator of an abuse of a dominant position cannot claim a reduction of the fine on the pretext that its delay in disclosing decisive information to its competitors could be explained by the lack of preparation of the public authorities at the time of the transition to DTT in overseas territories, when the facts show that this delay was deliberate, since it had the necessary information at its disposal well in advance of the date on which it was to be made available; CA Paris, 12 December 2024, LawLex202400009720JBJ. See also. Competition Authority decision No. 24-D-02 of February 6, 2024, LawLex202400001357JBJ, stressing that the legal uncertainty that may have existed prior to the Court of Justice's Pierre Fabre ruling on the ban on online sales can only be invoked by selective distribution networks, not franchise networks.

See however. Cass. com, 1 June 2022, LawLex202200002725JBJ, emphasizing that the novel character of an anticompetitive practice, the various possible expressions of which, given their variety and complexity, are not exhaustively listed either in EU law or in national law, does not prevent it from being sanctioned when it was reasonably foreseeable by the undertaking that it would be prohibited; CA Paris, 7 April 2022, LawLex202200002071JBJ, holding that even if its behavior had not yet been characterized and sanctioned prior to the adoption of the challenged decision, a GAFAM could not have been unaware of its anticompetitive risks, given that the Competition Authority had already voiced competition concerns about the non-transparent nature of its conduct, and discriminatory nature of the rules governing its advertising platform in previous cases, and that it had also been the subject of several alerts from the DINSIC (Interministerial Directorate of Digital and State Information and Communication Systems) and DGCCRF departments, with the result that the infringing nature of the practices implemented does not present any unforeseeable character likely to justify not imposing a penalty or limiting the amount of the penalty; Competition Authority decision No 24-D-09 of 29 October 2024, LawLex202400009005JBJ, ruling that ; the unprecedented nature of the practices, alleged by the undertakings in question, does not constitute a mitigating circumstance, since they are considered to be price-fixing practices, the unlawful nature of which has never been a matter of doubt and which have already been the subject of sanctions by the Competition Authority and the Commission; CA Paris, 12 December 2024, LawLex202400009677JBJ, pointing out that since there is no fundamental difference between an agreement that restricts resellers' pricing freedom in the implementation of promotional practices and a minimum price fixing agreement, the perpetrators of such practices can reasonably expect to be sanctioned by the Competition Authority.

Competition Council decision No 93-D-40 of 12 October 1993, LawLex200200003250JBJ; CA Paris, 10 March 1998, LawLex200200002598JBJ.

Competition Council decision No 93-D-39 of 5 October 1993, LawLex200200002437JBJ; No 93-D-42 of 19 October 1993, LawLex200200002459JBJ; CA Paris, 3 December 1998, LawLex200200002732JBJ; Competition Council decision No 98-D-25 of 17 March 1998, LawLex200200002438JBJ; 01-D-53 of 18 January 2001, LawLex200200002276JBJ.

Competition Authority decision No 12-D-08 of 6 March 2012, LawLex201200000340JBJ; No 13-D-03 of 13 February 2013, LawLex201300000173JBJ; No 14-D-20 of 22 December 2014, LawLex201500001516JBJ: undertakings that achieve 82 to 94% of their turnover with the sale of the products concerned by the infringement can be considered as “single-product” and claim a reduction of 70% of the fine; No 16-D-09 of 12 May 2016, LawLex201600000933JBJ. Also see Competition Authority decision No 14-D-19 of 18 December 2014, LawLex201500001522JBJ, which emphasizes that the status of single-product undertaking is not assessed with regard to the person having committed the offense, but of the undertaking and can therefore be excluded when the parent company, whose responsibility derives from the conduct of its subsidiary, achieves a consolidated global turnover well above that of its only subsidiary in the sector in question; No 15-D-03 of 11 March 2015, LawLex201500000341JBJ, the single-product nature of a participant in the cartel does not justify a reduction in the amount of the fine where it results only from the choice of internal organization of the group to which the activity is to be confined in a dedicated subsidiary; CA Paris, 27 October 2016, LawLex201600001790JBJ; 23 May 2017, LawLex201700000941JBJ, which restates that the single-product corporate character must be assessed in terms of the economic entity formed by the subsidiary author of the practices and the parent company which has a decisive influence on its behavior and which posits in principle that all the activities which contribute to turnover must be taken into account, including transfer to other affiliated companies, services billed internally to them and resales at a loss. Cf. CA Paris, 14 April 2016, LawLex201600000828JBJ, which specifies that in order to determine if a company is “single-product”, the Competition Authority must not only compare its turnover to the consolidated turnover of the group to which it belongs, but also make sure that that consolidated turnover is not achieved, including by the other companies in the group, as part of a single-product activity; Cass. com., 8 November 2017, LawLex201700001805JBJ, which emphasizes that when it compares the value of the sales to which the infringement relates  of the undertaking responsible for the practices to the global turnover of the group to which it belongs, to determine whether it is a “single-product” undertaking, the court cannot add to the first element of the equation sales made by other companies of the group in the sector in question, when they are not related to the offense; CA Paris, 19 July 2018, LawLex201800001111JBJ, emphasizing that the turnover to be taken into account to verify whether a cartel participant is a single-product undertaking cannot include its subcontracting activities in the sector in question; 20 December 2018, LawLex201800002000JBJ, holding that, as part of the assessment of the “single product” nature of a business, the basis of the penalty is constituted by the value of sales made on the market alone in relation to the infringement, and not by those carried out by the group to which it belongs at the worldwide level; Competition Authority decision No 19-D-24 of 17 December 2019, LawLex201900001582JBJ, stating that the of the ratio  between the value of the sales of a company compared to the turnover of the group to which it belongs does not constitute a reason justifying the reduction of the basic amount of its fine; CA Paris, 16 January 2020, LawLex202000000058JBJ; Competition Authority decision No 20-D-09 of 16 July 2020, LawLex202000001744JBJ; No 21-D-21 of 9 September 2021, LawLex202100005180JBJ; No 22-D-16 of 6 October 2022, LawLex202200009992JBJ. See also CA Paris, 1 July 2021, LawLex202100004330JBJ, cited above, and Competition Authority decision No. 23-D-12 of 11 December 2021, LawLex202100004330JBJ, cited above. No 23-D-12 of 11 December 2023, LawLex202300014350JBJ, stressing that the Competition Authority is not obliged to take into account the single-product structure of an undertaking when not calculating the amount of its fine on the basis of the value of its sales in relation to the offense; No 24-D-06 of 21 May 2024, LawLex202400004018JBJ, cited above, considering that when the value of sales represents 67% of its sales, the undertaking in question can claim to be “ single-product ‘; No 24-D-10 of 4 December 2024, LawLex202400009375JBJ, excluding the single-product nature of an undertaking when the value of sales used to calculate the fine does not exceed 30% of its sales.

CA Paris, 12 December 2000, LawLex200200002713JBJ, imitation of the behavior by the whole sector.

Competition Authority decision No 14-D-19 of 18 December 2014, LawLex201500001522JBJ, which emphasizes that the status of single-product undertaking is not assessed with regard to the person having committed the offense, but of the undertaking and can therefore be excluded when the parent company, whose responsibility derives from the conduct of its subsidiary, achieves a consolidated global turnover well above that of its only subsidiary in the sector in question; No 15-D-03 of 11 March 2015, LawLex201500000341JBJ, the single-product nature of a participant in the cartel does not justify a reduction in the amount of the fine where it results only from the choice of internal organization of the group to which the activity is to be confined in a dedicated subsidiary; CA Paris, 27 October 2016, LawLex201600001790JBJ; 23 May 2017, LawLex201700000941JBJ, which restates that the single-product corporate character must be assessed in terms of the economic entity formed by the subsidiary author of the practices and the parent company which has a decisive influence on its behavior and which posits in principle that all the activities which contribute to turnover must be taken into account, including transfer to other affiliated companies, services billed internally to them and resales at a loss. Cf. CA Paris, 14 April 2016, LawLex201600000828JBJ, which specifies that in order to determine if a company is “single-product”, the Competition Authority must not only compare its turnover to the consolidated turnover of the group to which it belongs, but also make sure that that consolidated turnover is not achieved, including by the other companies in the group, as part of a single-product activity; CA Paris, 27 October 2016, LawLex201600001790JBJ; 23 May 2017, LawLex201700000941JBJ, which restates that the single-product corporate character must be assessed in terms of the economic entity formed by the subsidiary author of the practices and the parent company which has a decisive influence on its behavior and which posits in principle that all the activities which contribute to turnover must be taken into account, including transfer to other affiliated companies, services billed internally to them and resales at a loss; CA Paris, 16 January 2020, LawLex202000000058JBJ; Competition Authority decision No 21-D-20 of 22 July 2021, LawLex202100004687JBJ; CA Paris, 6 October 2022, LawLex202200008326JBJ, cited above. 7 March 2024, LawLex202400002244JBJ, ruling that a ratio of less than 2% between the value of the infringers' sales and the consolidated sales of the group to which they belong does not entitle them to a fine reduction for a single-product business; 12 December 2024, LawLex202400009720JBJ.

Cass. com., 8 November 2017, LawLex201700001805JBJ, which emphasizes that when it compares the value of the sales to which the infringement relates  of the undertaking responsible for the practices to the global turnover of the group to which it belongs, to determine whether it is a “single-product” undertaking, the court cannot add to the first element of the equation sales made by other companies of the group in the sector in question, when they are not related to the offense; CA Paris, 20 December 2018, LawLex201800002000JBJ, holding that, as part of the assessment of the “single product” nature of a business, the basis of the penalty is constituted by the value of sales made on the market alone in relation to the infringement, and not by those carried out by the group to which it belongs at the worldwide level; Cass. com., 8 January 2025, LawLex202500000189JBJ, which considers that an undertaking cannot be classified as a “single-product undertaking” in that the value of sales related to the offense for the financial year concerned represents 60% of its turnover, since, although this ratio shows that the undertaking's activity related to the offense represents slightly more than half of its overall activity, it does not allow it to be considered as constituting the essential part of that activity.

Competition Authority decision No 24-D-06 of 21 May 2024, LawLex202400004018JBJ.

Competition Authority decision No 10-D-13 of 15 April 2010, LawLex201000000457JBJ; No 11-D-01 of 18 January 2011, LawLex201100000048JBJ.

Competition Council decision No 93-D-44 of October 26, 1993, LawLex200002908JBJ; 11 December 1993, 340 ; CA Paris, 27 September 1996, LawLex200002912JBJ.

Competition Authority decision No 15-D-19 of 15 December 2015, LawLex201500001733JBJ; according to which the companies which participated in certain meetings but not any bilateral or multilateral contacts supplementing or reinforcing the practices complained of, may be subject to a reduction of 10% of the amount of the fine in respect of their lesser participation; CA Paris, 23 May 2017, LawLex201700000941JBJ, holding that companies not part of the “main core” of the cartel can claim a reduction of the fine; Competition Authority decision No 18-D-24 of 5 December 2018, LawLex201800001876JBJ, undertaking having only participated in a small  number of the meetings over a short time period; No 19-D-24 of 17 December 2019, LawLex201900001582JBJ, cf. CA Paris, 19 July 2018, LawLex201800001111JBJ, stressing that the participation of an undertaking in the infringement can be classed as very active even if it has only a small market share or was only involved briefly in the cartel. Competition Authority decision No 20-D-04 of 16 March 2020, LawLex202000000542JBJ,  emphasizing that there is no principle that requires that the sanctions incurred by distributors implicated in a vertical cartel be less severe than those imposed on the suppliers involved in it, especially when, through their active and voluntary participation, they have adhered to their supplier's customer allocation policy; No 21-D-09 of 24 March 2021, LawLex202100000854JBJ, cited above, holding that the fact that an undertaking was not at the origin of the first anticompetitive contacts does not justify a reduction in the amount of its fine, since it participated in the offense with the same intensity as the other participants; Cass. com., 8 January 2025, LawLex202500000189JBJ, holding that the Competition Authority may rightly refuse to reduce the fine where the very numerous exchanges establish the intensity of the undertakings' participation in the infringing practices.

CA Paris, 16 September 2010, LawLex201000001026JBJ, which requires that the undertaking be subject to real economic difficulties and not merely a decrease in profitability; Competition Authority decision No 11-D-07 of 24 February 2011, LawLex201100000309JBJ, which agreed to review the amount of the fine having regard to the continuing financial difficulties of the undertaking concerned; Cass. com., 29 March 2011, LawLex201100000708JBJ, which specifies that unlike the difficulties encountered by the individual undertaking, the crisis in the sector concerned may not be taken into account in the calculation of the fine; Competition Authority decision No 12-D-08 of 6 March 2012, LawLex201200000340JBJ, for undertakings that only make a profit because of the aid and subsidies obtained under the common agricultural policy.

CA Paris, 15 June 2023, LawLex202300007984JBJ See also Competition Authority decision No 24-D-02 of 6 February 2024, LawLex202400001357JBJ. No 24-D-02 of 6 February 2024, LawLex202400001357JBJ, noting that the existence of a deficit to be carried forward is not such as to establish the existence of particular financial difficulties affecting the undertaking's ability to pay when the information provided does not take account of the group's ability to pay, that the parties did not provide all the information requested in the “ability to pay” questionnaire sent out by the Competition Authority, and that it cannot be ruled out that this loss-making situation can be explained by a choice of margin allocation within the various entities of the group.

Competition Authority decision No 12-D-06 of 26 January 2012, LawLex201200000163JBJ; CA Paris, 15 March 2018, LawLex201800000551JBJ, holding that an undertaking having experienced an appreciable fall in turnover does not establish that its own ability to contribute contribution was reduced when its equity and assets remain largely positive and allow it to pay the fine, which had moreover been provided for over previous years, and to make the investments it considers necessary; 19 July 2018, LawLex201800001111JBJ, holding that the contributory capacity of a company, which is assessed with regard to the assets that can be mobilized for the payment of the penalty and its capacity to generate resources to ensure payment, is not confined to its result of operating profits , its cash flow or the profitability of only the activity concerned by the infringement, but must include all the components of its income statement, all activities combined, and all of its assets ; 13 June 2019, LawLex201900000792JBJ, finding that to assess the contributory powers of an undertaking, it is necessary to take into account all of its underlying assets, such as real estate assets or stocks not essential to its activity, as well as its receivables; CA Paris, July 4, 2019, which considers that insufficient contributory capacity cannot be characterized by poor results, even negative results, but must be assessed in the light of the economic and financial situation of the undertaking as a whole, by analyzing the company accounts, where applicable the consolidated accounts, balance sheet, income statement and appendices, making it possible to determine both the existence of current profit before taxes, as well as available assets or a foreseeable debt capacity for the payment of the penalty imposed; Competition Authority decision No 19-D-21 of 28 October 2019, LawLex201900001279JBJ, emphasizing that the contributory capacities of an association of undertakings must be assessed taking into account the situation of its members; CA Paris, 14 September 2023, LawLex202300011514JBJ, cited above.

CA Paris, 7 March 2024, LawLex202400002244JBJ.

Competition Council decision No 00-D-67 of 13 February 2001, LawLex200200002431JBJ.

Competition Authority decision No 24-D-11 of 19 December 2024, LawLex202400009821JBJ.

CA Paris, 1 July 2021, LawLex202100004330JBJ, cited above; 14 July 2024, LawLex202400002338JBJ.

CA Paris, 30 January 2014, LawLex201400000145JBJ.

For an illustration, see Competition Authority decision No. 24-D-06 of 21 May 2024, LawLex202400004018JBJ, above, holding that the adoption of a code of good conduct and the taking of internal compliance measures do not reflect cooperation by the undertaking beyond its legal obligations, so that no mitigation of the fine can be granted on that basis; No 24-D-11 of 19 December 2024, LawLex202400009821JBJ, ruling that an undertaking's concern to comply with the law by establishing a culture of compliance within the group cannot be considered as a mitigating circumstance for a widespread restrictive agreement on prices implemented over a period of more than five years.

Competition Authority decision No. 14-D-16 of November 18, 2014, LawLex201400001281JBJ; No. 23-D-12 of December 11, 2023, LawLex202300014350JBJ, cited above; No. 24-D-06 of May 21, 2024, LawLex202400004018JBJ, cited above.

Competition Authority decision No 14-D-16 of 18 November 2014, LawLex201400001281JBJ; CA Paris, 20 November 2014, LawLex201400001321JBJ; 27 October 2016, LawLex201600001790JBJ; 19 July 2018, LawLex201800001111JBJ, cited above; No 19-D-11 of 29 May 2019, LawLex201900000718JBJ.

CA Paris, 21 January 2016, LawLex201600000151JBJ; Competition Authority decision No 18-D-05 of 13 March 2018, LawLex201800000422JBJ.

Competition Authority decision No 21-D-20 of 22 July 2021, LawLex202100004687JBJ, stressing that the Covid-19 crisis cannot be invoked as a mitigating circumstance by an undertaking whose stores were considered essential businesses during the periods of confinement; No 24-D-06 of 21 May 2024, LawLex202400004018JBJ, cited above, holding that circumstances relating to the regulatory framework and the war in Ukraine, which are general and common to undertakings in the sector, and not specific to the situation of a particular undertaking within the meaning of the Sanctions release, need not be taken into consideration for the purposes of individualization.

Competition Authority decision No 11-D-17 of 8 December 2011, LawLex201100001914JBJ, no account taken of the economic crisis as a contributory factor for the company as that circumstance is not specific to it; CA Paris, 20 November 2014, LawLex201400001321JBJ; 23 May 2017, LawLex201700000941JBJ.

Competition Authority decision No 11-D-13 of 5 October 2011, LawLex201100001563JBJ; No 19-D-24 of 17 December 2019, LawLex201900001582JBJ, above; No 24-D-06 of 21 May 2024, LawLex202400004018JBJ, above.

For a predominant position: on the market for the exploitation on movie theaters, CA Paris, 28 October 1992, LawLex200200002740JBJ; on the markets for consumer electronic goods, Competition Council decision No 95-D-71 of 15 November 1995, LawLex200200003421JBJ; CA Paris, 27 November 2001, LawLex200200002280JBJ.

Competition Council decision No 96-D-64 of 20 November 1996, LawLex200200002907JBJ; 12 December 2000, LawLex200200002713JBJ; CA Paris, 27 November 2001, LawLex200200002280JBJ; Competition Authority decision No 21-D-21 of 9 September 2021, LawLex202100005180JBJ.

CA Paris, 27 September 1996, LawLex200200002912JBJ; Competition Council decision No 00-D-45 of 22 November 2000, LawLex200200002708JBJ, concerning a public undertaking; Competition Council decision No 98-D-77 of 15 December 1998, LawLex200200002471JBJ, organization involved in a monopoly in the airport construction business.

Competition Authority decision No 16-D-09 of 12 May 2016, LawLex201600000933JBJ; No 20-D-04 of 16 March 2020, LawLex202000000542JBJ; No 20-D-04 of 16 March 2020, LawLex202000000542JBJ; No 24-D-06 of 21 May 2024, LawLex202400004018JBJ, cited above, increasing the basic amount of the fine by 100%; CA Paris, 12 December 2024, LawLex202400009720JBJ.

Until recently, the case law took into account the fact that an undertaking belonged to a group without ascertaining whether it had acted autonomously on the market, see especially CA Paris, 27 September 1996, LawLex200200002912JBJ; Competition Council decision No 97-D-39 of 17 June 1997, LawLex200200003036JBJ; Cass. com., 24 March 1998, LawLex200200003267JBJ; 13 March 2001, LawLex200200002399JBJ.The Court of Cassation nevertheless returned to this position and now considers that the court cannot increase the amount of the fine of a company that acted autonomously on the market: Cass. com., 18 February 2014, LawLex201400000329JBJ; 21 October 2014, LawLex201400001124JBJ; 17 March 2015, LawLex201500000336JBJ; Competition Authority decision No 15-D-03 of 11 March 2015, LawLex201500000341JBJ, taking into account the belonging to a group of a company over which the parent company exercises effective operational control; CA Paris, 21 January 2016, LawLex201600000151JBJ, 23 May 2017, LawLex201700000941JBJ, censuring the Authority for taking into account the offender's belonging to a group while having recognized its autonomy of behavior; 26 October 2017, LawLex201700001736JBJ; CA Paris, 15 March 2018, LawLex201800000551JBJ; Competition Authority decision No19-D-11 of 29 May 2019, LawLex201900000718JBJ, considering that an undertaking belongs to a large group should not be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of its fine when this circumstance played no role in the implementation of the infringement; No 19-D-24 of 17 December 2019, LawLex201900001582JBJ; No 20-D-09 of 16 July 2020, LawLex202000001744JBJ; CA Paris, 3 December 2020, LawLex202000003475JBJ, cited above; 6 October 2022, LawLex202200008326JBJ, cited above, holding that it is unnecessary to increase the penalty imposed on one of the companies making up the group in order to guarantee its dissuasive effect when the consolidated financial statements show a significant increase in debt and a worsening of the deficit already existing at the end of the previous financial year and, thus, the group's very relative power; Competition Authority decision No 23-D-13 of 19 December 2023, LawLex202300014730JBJ, specifying that the fact that the companies concerned belong to the world market leader group, whose financial strength is equivalent to that of the next five competitors, justifies a 10% increase in the fine imposed, in order to ensure that it is both dissuasive and proportionate; No 23-D-14 of 20 December 2023, LawLex202300014753JBJ; CA Paris, 7 March 2024, LawLex202400002244JBJ.

478. Individual situation of undertaking