La simple reprise d'une idée commerciale ne permet pas de caractériser des actes de parasitisme.

CA Paris, 4e ch. B, 15 mai 1998, n° 95-12330

Cass. soc., 14 mai 1998, n° 95-45.590

An undertaking's responsibility for implementing a general cartel can only be established if it is ascertained that it knew that the collusion in which it was participating was part of an overall plan which covered all of the elements of the agreement.

The collusions between competing manufacturers at regular meetings having as their object simultaneous and uniform price increases, maintaining market shares, concerted measures to control the supply of the EU market and the exchange of commercial information on deliveries, prices, plant standstills, order backlogs and machine utilization rates in support of these measures, constitutes one and the same agreement.

The statement of reasons must give each party a sufficient indication of the main legal or factual criteria which led them to be held liable for the breach.

The Commission has a margin of discretion when fixing the amount of the fine and is not obliged to apply a precise mathematical formula for that purpose.

Exchanging commercial information on prices in order to maintain simultaneous and uniform price increases constitutes a restrictive agreement.

An exchange of information between competing manufacturers regarding statistical information on order entries and order backlogs in order to support anticompetitive conduct, characterizes an unlawful agreement.

The exchange of commercial information on plant standstills, order backlogs and machine utilization rates constitutes a restrictive agreement.

CFI, 3rd chamber, extended composition, May 14, 1998, No T-295/94

When assessing the gravity of the infringement, the Commission may take into account the specific circumstances and context of the case, and the deterrent character of the fines, as a binding or exhaustive list of the criteria which must be applied has yet to be drawn up.

Different fines may be imposed to the participants of a cartel in view of their size, economic strength and their respective roles as either "ring leader" or "ordinary member" of the cartel.

The fact that the Commission applied fines of a certain level to certain types of infringements does not mean that it is estopped from raising the general level of fines.

Different fines may be imposed to the participants of a cartel in view of their respective roles as either "ring leader" or "ordinary member" of the cartel.

Different fines may be imposed to the participants of a cartel in view of their size and economic strength.

When determining the amount of the fine, the Commission may use the turnover obtained from sales of the product concerned by the infringement [Note: the 2006 Guidelines on setting fines only take account of the value of sales to which the infringement relates].

CFI, 3rd chamber, extended composition, May 14, 1998, No T-304/94

The Commission has a power of assessment in the determination of the amount of a fine and is not bound to apply any precise mathematical formula.

The gravity of infringements is determined by reference to, in particular, the specific circumstances and context of the case and the deterrent character of the fines, as no binding or exhaustive list of criteria to be applied has been drawn up.

CFI, 3rd chamber, extended composition, May 14, 1998, No T-309/94

The direction to stop the infringement can include a ban on continuing certain activities, or to act similarly in the future.

The fact that an undertaking does not abide by the outcome of meetings which have a manifestly anticompetitive object is not such as to relieve it of full responsibility for the fact that it participated in the cartel, if it has not publicly distanced itself from what was agreed in the meetings.

CFI, 3rd chamber, extended composition, May 14, 1998, No T-310/94

The Commission must indicate in its decision the figures taken into account in calculating the amount of the fines.

The requirement to give reasons for an individual decision aims at allowing its review by the EU authority and at supplying the interested party with a sufficient indication as to its validity.

The maximum fine imposed is calculated by taking into account the turnover of each of the undertakings party to the restrictive practice or of all the undertakings that are members of the association.

An undertaking will not receive a reduction in its fine if its co-operation with the inquiry does not go further than the obligations incumbent upon it.

CFI, 3rd chamber, extended composition, May 14, 1998, No T-317/94

A cartel is imputable to an undertaking having participated in a meeting between competing producers, which has a clearly anticompetitive object, even though its behavior on the market has not followed to the agreed conduct.

The Commission must indicate, in the decision, the basic factors that it systematically took into account when calculating the fine.

The reasoning of a decision must give each party an adequate indication to assess its basis, and allow a court to review its legality.

The Commission, which has a power of assessment in the determination of the amount of a fine, is not bound to apply any precise mathematical formula.

Creating and participating in meetings of a specific body concerning future price increases, the anticompetitive object of which was known and accepted by the participants from the outset, establishes the liability of those participants for price collusion.

Meetings between competing producers seeking to freeze market shares, control supply, harmonize prices and raise prices constitute an illegal cartel.

Producers are in violation of Article 101(1) TFEU where they take part in an agreement to maintain the market shares of the major producers at constant levels and take concerted measures to control supply in the EU market.

The exchange of purely statistical information between rival producers, which is neither in an individual form nor capable of being put into that form, does not amount to a cartel unless it produces actual anticompetitive effects.

The exchange of information which is neither in an individual form nor capable of being put into that form, does not amount to a cartel unless it produces actual anticompetitive effects.

CFI, 3rd chamber, extended composition, May 14, 1998, No T-334/94

A handwritten note is not sufficient to establish an undertaking's participation in a price cartel involving various manufacturers if it cannot be attributed to a specific party, does not refer to a specific event or meeting and mentions historical information about prices and downtime, where the only information of a non-historical nature concerning the plaintiff focuses on the state of its order backlogs.

The anticompetitive object of a meeting cannot be found from the mere confirmations of a single operator if the accuracy of its claims is challenged by several of the undertakings that participated in these meetings.

CFI, 3rd chamber, extended composition, May 14, 1998, No T-337/94

The Director-General for Competition who signs the letter accompanying the Statement of Objections, acts by virtue of a simple delegation of authority to sign, a normal means by which the Commission exercises its authority.

No provision requires documents to be sent in the language of the Member State in which the agent of a foreign undertaking lives, the choice of language of the Statement of Objections and of the decision being determined by the relationship between the complainant and the Member State.

The formality of authentication of a decision adopted in the course of a meeting by the college of Commissioners requires the signatures of the President and the Secretary-General of the Commission on the minutes of the meeting at which the decision was adopted and not on the decision itself.

A decision is duly notified when it has been communicated to the addressee, who was in a position to take full cognizance of it.

The order to stop the infringement can ban the parties from acting similarly in the future.

The maximum for a fine can be calculated on the basis of the total value of sales invoiced in the sector concerned by the infringement [Note: the 2006 Guidelines on setting fines only take account of the value of sales to which the infringement relates].

The near total absence of official or internal minutes of meetings between rival producers creates the presumption of an illegal object.

CFI, 3rd chamber, extended composition, May 14, 1998, No T-338/94

An undertaking can be held to be jointly and severally responsible for the payment of a fine imposed on another having committed an infringement.

CFI, 3rd chamber, extended composition, May 14, 1998, No T-339/94

An undertaking which attends meetings between competitors with the purpose of freezing market shares and controlling supply, and which does not publicly distance itself, is fully liable regardless of its subsequent behavior.

The act of indicating to an undertaking that there may be an opportunity for a fine to be reduced in exchange for cooperating with the Commission, does not imply that said undertaking is bound to admit the breach.

The General Court does not have jurisdiction to directly assess the legality of an investigation from the viewpoint of the provisions in the European Convention on Human Rights.

The fact of indicating to an undertaking that there may be an opportunity for a fine to be reduced in exchange for cooperating with the Commission, does not imply that the said undertaking is bound to admit the breach.

The concept of an agreement does not require that undertakings, having expressed their joint intention to implement identical or simultaneous price increases on the market, consider themselves bound in law, in fact or morally to adopt this conduct.

CFI, 3rd chamber, extended composition, May 14, 1998, No T-347/94

The Commission's dual function as investigating authority and decision-making authority does not infringe Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms when the decision is subject to review by an independent and impartial tribunal.

Observance of the rights of defense, a fundamental principle of EU Law, imposes an obligation on the Commission to include in its decision only the objections on which the parties have been able to submit comments.

It is enough that an undertaking was aware that its conduct led to a restriction on competition to establish that it has committed a deliberate infringement.

Measures seeking to conceal the collusion are aggravating circumstances.

Documentary indications combined with the almost total absence of minutes, whether official or internal, from meetings between competitors create a presumption of an illegal object.

CFI, 3rd chamber, extended composition, May 14, 1998, No T-348/94

The Commission is not required to discuss all the points of fact or law raised by the parties during the administrative procedure.

The consideration by the Commission, in previous decisions, of the implementation of a compliance program as a mitigating factor does not oblige it to do so in the future.

The absence of an infringement is a normal circumstance which the Commission may not consider as a mitigating factor.

To admit, during the administrative procedure, participation in collusion in price increase announcements whilst denying participation in the alleged infringement does not provide a reason to reduce the fine for co-operation.

The Commission may consider a previous infringement by the undertaking as an aggravating factor.

Meetings between rival manufacturers during which they agree to freeze their respective market shares and organize a coordinated downtime plan in order to control price rises amount to anticompetitive concerted practices.

Meetings between rival manufacturers during which they organize a coordinated downtime plan in order to control price increases amount to anticompetitive concerted practices.

CFI, 3rd chamber, May 14, 1998, No T-352/94

An undertaking's participation in meetings whose object is clearly anticompetitive must be upheld regardless of its subsequent behavior, when it has not distanced itself publicly from their content.

An undertaking's participation in an overall cartel cannot be upheld when it has not been proven, concerning meetings whose purpose is a market allocation in which it had not participated, that it knew or should have known its own conduct, being an infringement relating to a collusion on prices and downtime, formed part of an overall plan.

The simple fact that a company denied, in the reply to the Statement of Objections, its participation in the cartel excludes any fine reduction for co-operation with the procedure, while the company that does not challenge the allegations founding the objections can envoy it. 

The Commission cannot impose a future ban on the exchange of purely statistical information which is not in, or capable of being put into, the form of individual information in so far as such exchange between rival manufacturers does not amount, in itself, to a practice contrary to Article 101 TFEU.

Exchanges between competitive manufacturers of merely statistical data that are neither individual information nor information able to be individualized do not constitute in themselves practices conflicting with Article 101 TFEU.

Data exchange concerning neither individual information nor information able to be individualized does not constitute in itself an infringement of Article 101 TFEU.

CFI, 3rd chamber, May 14, 1998, No T-311/94

The transfer of tangible assets and workforce which were involved in the infringing act do not exclude its author's liability, nor the notification of the decision to the latter, as long as it remains an undertaking.

Where the Commission finds an infringement of competition rules and imposes fines on participating undertakings, having automatically taken into account certain basic factors in order to fix the amount of fines, it must set out those factors in the main body of the decision so that the addressees can verify that the level of the fine is correct and assess whether there has been any discrimination.

The fact that an undertaking pursues a more or less independent policy on the market, despite the concerted action with its competitors, does not necessarily establish a mitigating circumstance with regard to the imposition of a fine.

An undertaking, which does not express any view on the Commission's allegations cannot benefit from a reduction of the fine, if it did nothing either to facilitate the Commission's finding of the infringement or, alternatively, tu put an end to the infringement.

The fact that, in the past, the Commission applied fines of a certain level to certain types of infringements does not mean that it is estopped from raising that level if necessary in order to ensure the implementation of EU competition policy.

The gravity of the infringements must be established with reference in particular to  the specific circumstances and context of the case and the deterrent character of the fines, there being no binding or exhaustive list of the criteria to be applied.

The transfer of tangible assets and workforce which were involved in the infringing act does not exclude the notification of the decision to the perpetrator as long as it remains an undertaking.

Where the Commission finds an infringement of competition rules and imposes fines on participating undertakings, having automatically taken into account certain basic factors in order to fix the amount of fines, it must set out those factors in the main body of the decision so that the addressees can assess whether there has been any discrimination.

Article 101 TFEU is applicable to a cartel which is no longer in force when it continues to produce effects after its implementation formally ceased.

CFI, 3rd chamber, extended composition, May 14, 1998, No T-327/94

The anticompetitive conduct of a subsidiary can be attributed to the parent undertaking, even for the time before its acquisition.

An injunction terminating an infringement must not impose obligations on the undertaking that go beyond that which is appropriate and necessary to achieve the desired aim.

The fact that 100% of an undertaking's capital is held gives rise to the presumption that the parent undertaking actually controls the subsidiary and is solely responsible for the anticompetitive practices that it committed.

CFI, 3rd chamber, extended composition, May 14, 1998, No T-354/94

Liability for the practices implemented by the subsidiaries before their transfer to another group of undertakings, may be attributed to the new parent company if it participated in the infringement.

A decision that imposes fines for infringements of competition rules must set out the basic figures on which the penalty is based, if they have been systematically taken into account by the Commission.

The Statement of Objections must be expressed in sufficiently clear terms, even if of a summary nature, in order to enable the undertakings to defend themselves properly before the Commission adopts a final decision.

The reasoning for the Commission decision apportioning liability for the infringement must provide sufficient information to each of the addressees.

The Commission may only uphold objections in its final decision, to which the parties have been able to reply.

Where, prior to their acquisition, subsidiaries implemented anticompetitive practices, liability for this conduct can be attributed to the new parent company if it participated in the infringement.

The Commission is not bound by the level of fines set for past infringements.

CFI, 3rd chamber, extended composition, May 14, 1998, No T-308/94

Une note manuscrite ne suffit pas à établir la participation d'une entreprise à une entente de prix entre producteurs dès lors qu'elle n'est pas individualisée, ne permet pas d'identifier une réunion particulière et mentionne des données à caractère historique sur les prix et les temps d'arrêt, l'unique information non historique concernant la requérante portant sur l'état de ses commandes en carnet.

L'objet anticoncurrentiel d'une réunion ne peut être établi à partir des seules affirmations d'un opérateur dès lors que leur exactitude est contestée par plusieurs des entreprises ayant participé à ces réunions.

TPICE, 3e ch. élargie, 14 mai 1998, n° T-337/94

Un particulier ne peut, sans se rendre coupable de tromperie, revendre à un tiers un véhicule qu'il a acheté avec 115 700 km au compteur, en prétendant qu'il n'a roulé que 58 810 km.

CA Grenoble, ch. corr., 14 mai 1998, n° 581-98

Malgré une présentation équivoque, les documents d'une loterie publicitaire qui ne présentent pas de véritable personnalisation au nom du client ne permettent pas d'établir l'existence d'une faute à l'encontre de la société organisatrice de la loterie.

CA Douai, 2e ch., 14 mai 1998, n° 96-08405

Deux sociétés ayant l'une pour l'autre intérêt à développer leurs affaires, contribuant par leurs activités réciproques et leur collaboration, à l'obtention et à l'accroissement d'un résultat qui leur est commun et dont l'expansion leur bénéficie, sont liées par un mandat d'intérêt commun.

Compte tenu de la durée des relations entre les parties et de l'importance de l'activité déployée pendant ce temps, la rupture unilatérale initiée par le mandant justifie le principe d'une indemnisation à la mesure du préjudice souffert par le mandataire.

Dans la mesure où le silence du mandataire d'intérêt commun n'emporte pas acceptation de la rupture de son contrat et où, le mandant n'établit ni la preuve de réorganisation de sa commercialisation alléguée ni d'une cause légitime de révocation unilatérale, le mandataire a droit à une indemnité de rupture.

CA Versailles, 12e ch. sect. 1, 14 mai 1998, n° 1922-95

Le contrat soumis aux dispositions relatives au démarchage, qui comprend un formulaire de rétractation dont l'emplacement entraîne lors de son utilisation la suppression d'une partie du contrat, est entaché de nullité.

CA Nîmes, 2e ch. A, 14 mai 1998, n° 96-517

Le chiffre d'affaires réalisé avec les produits concernés par l'infraction est un critère d'évaluation de l'amende.

Lors de l'appréciation de la gravité de l'infraction, la Commission peut tenir compte des circonstances particulières de l'affaire, de son contexte et de la portée dissuasive des amendes, aucune liste exhaustive et contraignante de critères n'étant établie.

Des amendes différentes peuvent être infligées aux participants à l'entente eu égard à leur taille, leur puissance économique et leur rôle de "chef de file" ou "membre ordinaire".

Le fait que par le passé la Commission ait appliqué des amendes d'un certain niveau à certaines infractions ne la prive pas de la possibilité d'élever le niveau général des amendes.

Des amendes différentes peuvent être infligées aux participants à l'entente eu égard à leur rôle de "chef de file" ou "membre ordinaire".

Des amendes différentes peuvent être infligées aux participants à l'entente eu égard à leur taille et à leur puissance économique.

Des amendes différentes peuvent être infligées aux participants à l'entente eu égard à leur rôle de "chef de file" ou "membre ordinaire" [NDLR : le critère du rôle passif ou suiviste de l'entreprise a été abandonné par la communication de 2006].

TPICE, 3e ch. élargie, 14 mai 1998, n° T-304/94

La résiliation du contrat à l'initiative de l'agent commercial est imputable à une faute grave du mandant, qui suspend, sans raison valable, le paiement des commissions dues à l'agent.

Le non-paiement des commissions constitue une faute grave du mandant qui justifie la résiliation du contrat à l'initiative de l'agent commercial.

Le respect d'un délai de préavis ne s'applique pas en cas de résiliation d'un contrat à durée déterminée.

CA Rouen, 2e ch. civ., 14 mai 1998, n° 96-03424

Il incombe au mandant de rémunérer son agent commercial, peu important le fait qu'il n'ait pas réclamé ses commissions pendant quatre ans.

CA Versailles, 12e ch. sect. 1, 14 mai 1998, n° 2297-95

Une entreprise peut être déclarée solidairement responsable du paiement de l'amende infligée à une autre ayant commis une infraction.

TPICE, 3e ch. élargie, 14 mai 1998, n° T-339/94

Une entente est imputable à une entreprise ayant participé à une réunion entre producteurs concurrents, manifestement anticoncurrentielle par son objet, alors même que son comportement sur le marché n'a pas été conforme au comportement convenu.

Les réunions entre producteurs concurrents ayant pour objet un gel des parts de marché, un contrôle de l'offre, une harmonisation des prix et des hausses de prix constituent des ententes illicites.

L'échange d'informations qui ne sont ni individuelles ni individualisables ne caractérise une entente que s'il produit in concreto des effets anticoncurrentiels.

Des fabricants enfreignent l'article 101, paragraphe 1, TFUE, lorsqu'ils participent à un accord visant à maintenir les parts de marché des principaux fabricants à un niveau constant et se concertent pour prendre des mesures de contrôle de l'approvisionnement du marché européen.

Le fait de créer et participer aux réunions d'un organe, portant sur de futures augmentations de prix, dont l'objet anticoncurrentiel était connu et accepté des participants dès l'origine, établit leur responsabilité d'une collusion sur les prix.

La motivation de la décision doit donner à chaque partie une indication suffisante pour apprécier son fondement et permettre au juge d'exercer un contrôle de légalité.

L'échange entre producteurs concurrents d'informations purement statistiques, n'ayant pas le caractère d'informations individuelles ou individualisables, ne constitue une entente que s'il produit in concreto des effets anticoncurrentiels.

La Commission, qui dispose d'un pouvoir d'appréciation lors de la fixation du montant de l'amende, n'est pas tenue d'appliquer une formule mathématique précise.

La Commission doit indiquer dans la décision les éléments de base qu'elle a systématiquement pris en considération pour le calcul de l'amende.

TPICE, 3e ch. élargie, 14 mai 1998, n° T-334/94

L'article 101 TFUE est applicable à une entente qui a cessé d'être en vigueur dès lors qu'elle poursuit ses effets au-delà de sa cessation formelle.

La cession des éléments matériels et humains ayant concouru à la commission de l'infraction n'exclut pas la responsabilité de son auteur, qui justifie la notification de la décision à ce dernier, dès lors qu'il continue d'exister en tant qu'entreprise.

La cession des éléments matériels et humains ayant concouru à la commission de l'infraction n'exclut pas la notification de la décision à son auteur, dès lors qu'il continue d'exister en tant qu'entreprise.

Lorsqu'elle inflige des amendes aux entreprises ayant participé à l'infraction, la Commission doit, si elle a systématiquement pris en compte certains éléments de base pour fixer le montant des amendes, indiquer ces éléments dans le corps de la décision afin de permettre à ses destinataires d'apprécier l'existence d'une éventuelle discrimination.

Le fait que la Commission a appliqué dans le passé des amendes d'un certain niveau à certains types d'infractions ne saurait la priver de la possibilité d'élever ce niveau, si cela s'avère nécessaire pour assurer la mise en uvre de la politique européenne de la concurrence.

Lorsqu'elle constate, dans une décision, une infraction aux règles de la concurrence et inflige des amendes aux entreprises ayant participé à celle-ci, la Commission doit, si elle a systématiquement pris en considération certains éléments de base pour fixer le montant des amendes, indiquer ces éléments dans le corps de la décision afin de permettre aux destinataires de celle-ci de vérifier le bien-fondé du niveau de l'amende et d'apprécier l'existence d'une éventuelle discrimination.

La gravité des infractions doit être établie en fonction notamment, des circonstances particulières de l'affaire, de son contexte et de la portée dissuasive des amendes, sans qu'ait été établie une liste contraignante ou exhaustive de critères devant obligatoirement être pris en considération.

L'entreprise qui se contente de ne pas prendre position sur les allégations de la Commission ne peut bénéficier d'une réduction d'amende dès lors qu'elle n'a pas permis de faciliter la constatation de l'infraction et le cas échéant, sa cessation.

Le fait qu'une entreprise poursuive une politique plus ou moins indépendante sur le marché, malgré la concertation avec ses concurrents, ne constitue pas nécessairement une circonstance atténuante.

Court decisions rendered in 1998 - Page 39