Cass. com., 11 avril 1995, n° 92-21.563

Cass. com., 11 avril 1995, n° 93-12.918

The difficulties experienced by the European industry cannot be attributed only to the effects of decisions sanctioning certain European producers for having taken part in anticompetitive restrictive practices, where the position of rival European producers worsened to the same extent as the position of the penalized undertakings.

A European operator who has bought a producer from a country concerned by dumping practices and imported itself the product concerned, belongs to the European industry where these imports only represented 10% of the production sold in the EU and ceased at the expiry of the existing contracts, its foreign investments constituting a normal business extension of its commercial activities.

Imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of disodium carbonate originating in the United States of America

EC, April 10, 1995, No 823-95

Les difficultés rencontrées par l'industrie de l'Union ne peuvent être attribuées aux seuls effets des décisions sanctionnant certains producteurs européens pour participation à des ententes anticoncurrentielles, dès lors que la position des producteurs européens concurrents s'est détériorée dans la même mesure que celle des entreprises sanctionnées.

L'opérateur européen, qui a racheté un producteur d'un pays concerné par les pratiques de dumping et importé lui-même le produit concerné, appartient à l'industrie de l'Union dès lors que ces importations ne représentent que 10 % de la production vendue dans l'UE et ont cessé à l'arrivée du terme des contrats existants, ses investissements à l'étranger constituant une extension normale de ses activités commerciales.

Instituant un droit antidumping provisoire sur les importations de carbonate disodique originaire des États-Unis d'Amérique

CCE, 10 avril 1995, n° 823-95

L'action en concurrence déloyale autorise les demandeurs à solliciter tant une condamnation à des dommages-intérêts qu'une injonction à l'encontre de l'auteur du comportement fautif et la publication de la décision.

L'employeur qui emploie sciemment les salariés du concurrent en violation d'une clause de non-concurrence, se rend coupable de débauchage fautif.

CA Paris, 4e ch. A, 10 avril 1995, n° 93-000017

L'interdiction faite à un distributeur par le fournisseur d'intégrer certaines rémunérations dans le seuil de revente à perte de ses produits peut s'analyser en une pratique de prix imposés [NDLR : Décision antérieure aux lois Dutreil et Chatel].

Cass. crim., 10 avril 1995, n° 94-82.535

L'alignement sur la concurrence est un moyen de défense au fond qui peut être soulevé à tout moment de la procédure.

La notion de zone d'activité s'apprécie au regard de l'entreprise et du marché sur lequel elle intervient.

Cass. crim., 10 avril 1995, n° 94-82.026

CA Versailles, 1re ch. sect. 2, 7 avril 1995, n° 8452-93

La protection du nom commercial à l'encontre d'une imitation créatrice de confusion s'étend à toutes les utilisations et à tous les supports.

CA Paris, 25e ch. B, 7 avril 1995, n° 7042-93

CFI, 1st chamber, April 6, 1995, No C-151/89

Article 101(1) TFEU does not require the restrictions of competition ascertained actually to have affected trade between Member States but merely requires that it be established that they were capable of having that effect.

Since it is likely to divert trade flows from the direction they would otherwise take, an import quota agreement may affect trade between Member States.

An indirect exchange of information is a component of the complex infringement resulting in particular from meetings between competing producers for the purpose of fixing prices and quotas insofar as its aim is to ensure that such concerted action is properly effective.

The rule of reason cannot be applied to an agreement that, by its very nature, has an anticompetitive object.

The existence of a structural crisis cartel may be taken into account as a mitigating circumstance when determining the amount of the fine.

The fact that an undertaking's behavior is known, authorized or encouraged by the national authorities has no bearing on the applicability of European competition rules.

CFI, 1st chamber, April 6, 1995, No T-147/89

A branch, agency or other ancillary establishment within the meaning of Article 7(5) of Regulation No 1215/2012 (former Article 5(5) of Regulation No 44/2002) is an entity capable of being the principal, or even exclusive, interlocutor for third parties in the negotiation of contracts.

The expression 'claim arising out of the operations of a branch, agency or other establishment' within the meaning of Article 7(5) of Regulation No 1215/2012 (former Article 5(5) of Regulation No 44/2002) does not presuppose that the undertakings in question entered into by the branch in the name of its parent body are to be performed in the Member State in which the branch is established.

CJEC, April 6, 1995, No C-439/93

Au sens de l'article 7, paragraphe 5, du règlement 1215-2012 (ancien article 5, paragraphe 5, du règlement 44-2001), une succursale, une agence ou tout autre établissement secondaire est une entité susceptible d'être l'interlocuteur principal, voire exclusif, de tiers dans la négociation de contrats.

La notion de contestation relative à l'exploitation de la succursale, de l'agence ou de tout autre établissement au sens de l'article 7, paragraphe 5, du règlement Bruxelles (I) bis (ancien article 5, paragraphe 5, du règlement 44-2001) ne suppose pas que les engagements litigieux pris par la succursale, au nom de la maison mère, soient exécutés dans l'Etat membre où la succursale est établie.

CJCE, 6 avril 1995, n° C-439/93

L'absence de la mention du kilométrage d'un véhicule sur le certificat de vente ne suffit pas à caractériser la mauvaise foi du vendeur, dès lors que l'acquéreur a reçu, en même temps que ledit certificat, le rapport de contrôle technique indiquant le kilométrage.

Le délit de tromperie n'est pas caractérisé, dès lors qu'il n'est pas établi que le vendeur, non-professionnel de l'automobile, ait délibérément caché à l'acquéreur le mauvais état du véhicule vendu.

CA Bordeaux, 3e ch. corr., 6 avril 1995, n° 710-94

Simply participating, even non-actively, in meetings between competing manufacturers with the object of price and quota fixing is enough to characterize participation in an agreement, even if the undertaking in question does not follow the defined prices and quotas.

The potential threat of retaliatory measures from competitors or national authorities does not justify participating in a restrictive agreement.

The potential threat of retaliatory measures from competitors or national authorities does not justify participation in a restrictive agreement.

CFI, 1st chamber, April 6, 1995, No T-152/89

A restrictive agreement may be the object of parallel proceedings, one before the Commission, in application of Article 101 TFEU, and the other before national authorities, in application of national law.

Although the Commission must take the penalties imposed by national authorities for the same events into consideration, it remains autonomous and may prescribe a fine 115 times higher.

In its decision, the Commission must specify the duration of the infringement for which it imposes a fine.

An exchange of information concerning the quantities delivered is not sufficient to establish that a quota agreement between undertakings exists when the existence of a patent licence justifies that exchange.

An exchange of information concerning the quantities delivered is not sufficient to prove that a quota agreement exists when the existence of a patent licence agreement justifies that exchange.

CFI, 1st chamber, April 6, 1995, No T-149/89

Communications with Member States are documents that are confidential in nature and which the Commission need not provide to the parties.

CJEC, 6th chamber, April 6, 1995, No C-310/93 P

Access to the file can be refused when the request is made after the adoption and notification of the decision.

The existence of a structural crisis cartel contract whose legality is presumed may be considered as a mitigating factor justifying the reduction of the amount of the fine.

Establishing that the parties envisaged concluding a quota agreement is not sufficient to qualify the existence of a joint intention on their part concerning a sufficiently determined object.

The finding of an exchange of information on quotas does not prove the existence of an anticompetitive agreement when a patent licence agreement exists as a plausible alternative explanation.

An intra-group agreement falls within the scope of Article 101 TFEU when the parent undertaking only holds 25.001% of the capital of its subsidiary.

Exportation clauses included in a sales contract, which are essentially intended to prevent the re-exportation towards the country of production, are anticompetitive.

An agreement, under which one party agrees not to bring a complaint against a competitor in exchange for a commitment by the latter not to export to another Member State, is a cartel.

CFI, 1st chamber, April 6, 1995, No T-145/89

	A decision sent by registered letter whose postal acknowledgment of receipt has no signature and whose date of receipt is wrong has not been duly notified and cannot mark the starting point for the period for bringing an appeal.

The time period for initiating annulment proceedings against a Commission decision starts only from the receipt of an acknowledgment of receipt dated and signed by its addressee.

When the end of a time limit for an appeal falls on a Sunday, its expiry is extended until the next working day.

The role of leader and instigator of the infringement, as well as the pressure exerted on other undertakings to join the restrictive agreement, constitute aggravating circumstances that justify a 50% increase of the basic amount of the fine.

A decision given by the Commission which is subject to changes in its spelling and grammar after its adoption, which does not bear the exact date of its adoption and whose lack of authority of the signatory of the notified instruments has been established, should be annulled.

CFI, 2nd chamber, April 6, 1995, No T-80/89

The presence of an undertaking in meetings having a manifestly anticompetitive object is sufficient to hold it liable for the infringement, even though it did not play an active part, when that undertaking allowed other participants to believe that it subscribed to the purpose of the meetings and that it would comply.

The possibility for a manufacturer to produce various types of wire-mesh welded from the same raw material reveals that the products in question belong to the same market.

Different kinds of welded steel mesh belong to the same market, especially regarding the switch of customers from one product to the other in the event of significant price reduction.

The fact that for the product in question, competition only exists in border zones, does not exclude that the national market as a whole is affected by restrictive practices of which it is the object.

The fact that an agreement promotes an increase, even a significant one, in the volume of trade between Member States, is not sufficient to exclude the possibility that the agreement may affect trade in such a way as to prejudice the attainment of the objectives of a single market.

It is not necessary to check whether the undertaking's individual participation in an agreement could affect trade between Member States for Article 101 TFEU to be applicable, or whether the restrictions on competition have actually and appreciably affected trade between Member States, if it is established that they are likely to have such an effect.

It is not necessary to check whether the undertaking's individual participation in an agreement could affect trade between Member State for Article 101 TFEU to be applicable, or whether the restrictions on competition have actually and appreciably affected trade between Member States, if it is established that they are likely to have such an effect.

When setting the amount of the fine, although the Commission must take into account penalties imposed by national authorities for the same actions, it retains the autonomous power to impose penalties and can set a fine which is 800 times higher.

In order to impose a fine on an undertaking, it suffices that an undertaking be aware that its conduct restricts competition.

The Commission can impose a single fine for various infringements, especially when their object concerned the same type of conduct on different markets.

The existence of a structural crisis cartel agreement may be considered as a mitigating circumstance justifying the reduction of the fine.

The participation in an agreement between competing producers, the purpose of which is to set prices with a view to limiting imports, is unlawful even if the undertaking at stake did not comply with it.

The participation in an agreement between competing producers, the purpose of which is to set prices and quotas with a view to limiting imports, is unlawful even if the undertaking at stake did not comply with it.

A gentlemen's agreement can be an agreement within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU.

The circumstance under which an agreement promotes an increase, even a significant one, in the volume of trade between Member States, is not sufficient to exclude the possibility that the agreement may affect trade in such a way as to prejudice the attainment of the objectives of a single market.

CFI, 1st chamber, April 6, 1995, No T-141/89

Article 101(1) TFEU does not require that the restriction on competition has actually and appreciably affected trade between Member States, but only that it be capable of having such an effect.

The Commission can impose a single fine for various infringements, particularly when they involved the same type of conduct on different markets.

The turnover for the products concerned by the infringement and belonging to the same market gives an indication of the scale of the infringement for the purposes of  fixing the fine [Note: the 2006 Guidelines on setting fines only take account of the value of sales to which the infringement relates].

Meetings between competing producers, the purpose of which is, inter alia, to set minimum prices for product, are anticompetitive by their object and infringe Article 101 TFEU, whether they had actual effects or not.

CFI, 1st chamber, April 6, 1995, No T-144/89

It is not necessary to check whether the individual participation of each undertaking involved in the agreement has an effect on trade between Member States for Article 101(1) to be applicable.

Article 101 TFEU does not require that the restrictions on competition which have been established actually and appreciably affect trade between Member States, but only requires that they be capable of having such an effect.

Because a decision constitutes a whole, each of its sections must be read in light of the others in order to verify whether the duty to state the reasons has been respected.

The fact that an undertaking is aware that its conduct restricts competition, is sufficient to sentence it to pay a fine.

The Commission has discretion to set fine amounts and is not required to apply a precise mathematical formula.

CFI, 1st chamber, April 6, 1995, No T-150/89

Insofar as they are likely to divert patterns of trade from the course which they would otherwise have followed, agreements for arranging quotas are liable to affect trade between Member States.

Article 101(1) TFEU does not require that the ascertained restrictions on competition have actually and appreciably affected trade between Member States, but only that they be capable of doing so.

Insofar as they are likely to divert patterns of trade from the course which they would otherwise have followed, agreements for arranging quotas for imports are liable to affect trade between Member States.

The existence of a structural crisis cartel can be an attenuating circumstance when determining the amount of the fine.

The proof of a meeting of minds about a specific object, which is a necessary condition for the classification of an agreement, is not established if the competing manufacturers have only intended to conclude a quota agreement depending on the reaction of the other undertakings.

The fact that the association of undertakings' behavior is known, authorized or encouraged by national authorities has no influence on the applicability of EU competition rules.

The rule-of-reason cannot be applied to an agreement which, by nature, has an anticompetitive object.

An indirect exchange of information constitutes one aspect of the complex infringement resulting from meetings between competing manufacturers, the object of which was to fix prices and quotas, as its purpose was to ensure that the concertation was effective.

CFI, 1st chamber, April 6, 1995, No T-148/89

The question of the individual participation of an undertaking in an agreement, as regards its weak position on the market, is not relevant when assessing the effects of an horizontal price-fixing and quotas agreement on competition and trade between Member States.

Article 101 TFEU does not require that the restrictions on competition which have been established actually and appreciably affect trade between Member States, but only requires that they be capable of having this effect.

The assessment of the actual effects of an agreement between competing producers having as its object price fixing is not relevant since it has an anticompetitive object.

The assessment of the actual effects of an agreement between competing producers having as its object fixing of quotas is not relevant since it has an anticompetitive object.

CFI, 1st chamber, April 6, 1995, No T-143/89

Article 101 TFEU does not require that the practices at stake actually had an appreciable effect on trade between Member States.

The participation in a meeting between competing producers, whose object is price and quota fixing, is contrary to Article 101 TFEU, even though the undertaking in question does not accede to the agreements and does not play an active part in the meetings, if it does not publicly distance itself from their content.

CFI, 1st chamber, April 6, 1995, No T-142/89

The exclusion of any potential competitor modifies the structure of competition and is thereby likely to affect trade between Member States.

Although the Commission must provide justification for decisions that establish an infringement of competition rules, issue injunctions or impose fines, it is not required to discuss all the matters of fact and law raised during the administrative proceedings.

As the injunction may include an order to bring an end to certain acts, practices or situations which are contrary to the Treaty, or an order to engage in certain activities, the Commission may oblige the applicant to provide the essential information that it refused to give over.

The obligations imposed on undertakings in order to bring an infringement of competition law to an end must not exceed what is appropriate and necessary to attain the re-establishment of compliance with the rules infringed.

A television channel's use of its copyright over its programme listings in order to secure a monopoly on the secondary market for weekly television guides and to hinder the emergence of a new product corresponding to a specific, constant and regular potential demand on the part of consumers, without justification as regards its television broadcasting or publishing activities, constitutes an abuse.

Although a refusal to licence by a dominant undertaking does not in itself constitute an abuse of said dominant position, the exercise of that exclusive right by the proprietor may however, in exceptional circumstances, involve abusive conduct.

A dominant undertaking's refusal, by relying on national copyright provisions, to provide basic information on programme scheduling, which is the indispensable raw material for compiling a weekly television guide, is abusive where, without any actual or potential substitute, this practice prevents the appearance of a new product, a comprehensive weekly guide to televisions programmes, corresponding to specific, constant and regulator potential consumer demand.

CJEC, April 6, 1995, No C-241/91 P

CA Rennes, 3e ch. corr., 6 avril 1995, n° 94-01065

L'actionnaire, qui ne détient que 20 % du capital et des droits de vote de la cible tandis que l'autre actionnaire en contrôle 80 %, exerce néanmoins un contrôle conjoint dans la mesure où il dispose d'un pouvoir de codécision.

L'actionnaire, qui ne détient que 20 % du capital et des droits de vote de la cible tandis que l'autre actionnaire en contrôle 80 %, exerce néanmoins un contrôle conjoint dans la mesure où il dispose d'un droit de veto sur l'ensemble des décisions stratégiques de l'entreprise commune.

Des contrats de représentation exclusive peuvent constituer des restrictions nécessaires et directement liées à la mise en uvre de l'opération.

Une clause de licence exclusive de marque, souscrite par les entreprises fondatrices pour la durée de l'accord, constitue une restriction de concurrence accessoire à la concentration dès lors qu'elle exprime la réalité du retrait des sociétés fondatrices du marché de l'entreprise commune.

Une clause de non-concurrence souscrite par les entreprises fondatrices pour la durée de l'accord constitue une restriction de concurrence accessoire à la concentration dès lors qu'elle exprime la réalité du retrait des sociétés fondatrices du marché de l'entreprise commune.

La concentration, qui place la nouvelle entité en pôle position avec une part de marché de 22 à 23 %, est compatible avec le marché intérieur compte tenu de la présence de concurrents puissants.

Deux clauses, valables pour trois ans, ayant pour objet de permettre à l'entreprise commune d'acquérir progressivement sa pleine autonomie fonctionnelle  en recourant à certains services administratifs des sociétés mères ou en étant associée à l'une ou l'autre dans la négociation vis-à-vis de ses fournisseurs, constituent des restrictions nécessaires et directement liées à la mise en uvre de l'opération.

Une clause de licence exclusive de marque souscrite par les entreprises fondatrices constitue une restriction accessoire à la concentration, dès lors qu'elle exprime la réalité du retrait des sociétés fondatrices du marché de l'entreprise commune.

La concentration qui conduit à la création du premier acteur sur le marché en cause, avec une part de marché de 22 à 23 %, est compatible avec le marché intérieur, compte tenu de la présence de concurrents puissants.

Les services prestés par les agences de voyages pour les voyages d'affaires et les services prestés pour le voyage de loisir, appartiennent à des marchés distincts, dans la mesure où la nature de la prestation est différente : organisation globale d'un séjour en ce qui concerne l'activité loisir ; billetterie en ce qui concerne l'activité voyage d'affaires.

Les services prestés par les agences de voyages pour les voyages d'affaires et les services prestés pour le voyage de loisir appartiennent à des marchés distincts, dès lors qu'ils s'adressent à des clientèles différentes, entreprise dans le premier cas, particulier, dans l'autre.

La variation d'un pays à l'autre de la législation relative à la profession d'agent de voyage et au régime juridique des contrats et la nécessité de disposer d'une infrastructure dans chaque pays confèrent une dimension nationale aux marchés de service prestés pour les agences de voyage pour les voyages d'affaires et pour le voyage de loisirs.

Le recours à des accords de représentation avec des agences étrangères plutôt qu'à l'exercice direct de prestations transfrontalières, du fait de la nécessité d'une implantation dense dans les différents pays du monde, permet d'identifier des marchés nationaux de services prestés par les agences de voyage pour les voyages d'affaires et pour le voyage de loisirs.

Les marchés des services prestés par les agences de voyages pour les voyages d'affaires et des services prestés pour le voyage de loisirs sont nationaux en raison de la variation d'un pays à l'autre de la législation relative à la profession d'agent de voyage et au régime juridique des contrats.

CCE, 6 avril 1995, n° M.564

L'article 101 TFUE est applicable même si la pratique en cause n'a pas effectivement affecté le commerce entre Etats membres.

La participation à une réunion de producteurs concurrents ayant pour objet une fixation de prix et de quotas est contraire à l'article 101 TFUE même si l'entreprise en cause n'a pas souscrit aux accords ni pris une part active aux réunions dès lors qu'elle ne s'est pas distanciée publiquement de leur contenu.

La participation à une réunion de producteurs concurrents ayant pour objet une fixation des prix et des quotas est contraire à l'article 101 TFUE même si l'entreprise en cause n'a pas souscrit aux accords ni pris une part active aux réunions dès lors qu'elle ne s'est pas distanciée publiquement de leur contenu.

TPICE, 1re ch., 6 avril 1995, n° T-142/89

Les correspondances avec les États membres sont des documents à caractère confidentiel qui n'ont pas à être communiqués aux parties par la Commission.

Court decisions rendered in 1995 - Page 38