Cass. 2e civ., 4 juin 2020, n° 19-12.727

CA Lyon, 1re ch. civ. A, 4 juin 2020, n° 18/00480

CA Aix-en-Provence, 1re et 3e ch. réunies, 4 juin 2020, n° 17/18018

La loi applicable à un contrat d'agent commercial qui s'exécute en Algérie est, en vertu de la convention de la Haye,  la loi française lorsque les parties ont désigné les juridictions françaises pour connaître de leurs différends, ont fait usage du français pour la rédaction du contrat et lorsque la France est le lieu de provenance des produits, de validation des devis et de règlement des commissions.

L'article L. 442-1, II (ancien art. L. 442-6, I, 5°) du Code de commerce ne constitue pas une loi de police dans l'ordre international dès lors qu'elle vise davantage à la sauvegarde des intérêts privés d'une partie que de l'organisation économique du pays au point d'en exiger l'application à toute situation entrant dans son champ d'application.

CA Paris, ch. com. internationale, 3 juin 2020, n° 19-03758

CA Poitiers, ch. civ. 1, 3 juin 2020, n° 18/01788

CA Montpellier, ch. com., 2 juin 2020, n° 17/05064

CA Rouen, ch. civ. et com., 2 juin 2020, n° 18-02346

Une clause d'arbitrage n'est pas nulle ou manifestement inapplicable du seul fait que les dispositions impératives de l'article L. 442-4 (ancien art. L. 442-6, III) du Code de commerce sont applicables au litige.

La clause compromissoire étant juridiquement indépendante du contrat principal qui la contient, le déséquilibre significatif de la relation commerciale qui résulterait de l'économie générale de ce dernier est sans influence sur sa validité. 

CA Paris, Pôle 1 ch. 1, 2 juin 2020, n° 17-18900

La clause aux termes de laquelle les réclamations concernant les erreurs de facturation sont à effectuer dans les deux mois de la réception du relevé ne crée pas de déséquilibre significatif dès lors qu'elle n'a pas pour objet de prévoir une dérogation à la prescription de droit commun, mais d'établir une présomption de régularité des factures.

CA Rouen, ch. civ. et com., 2 juin 2020, n° 17-00607

CA Paris, Pôle 5 ch. 8, 2 juin 2020, n° 18/23074

CA Paris, Pôle 5 ch. 8, 2 juin 2020, n° 17/18974

CA Lyon, 8e ch., 2 juin 2020, n° 19/01805

CA Angers, ch. soc., 29 mai 2020, n° 18/00395

Cass. 2e civ., 28 mai 2020, n° 19-14.534

Cass. 3e civ., 28 mai 2020, n° 19-10.017

Cass. 2e civ., 28 mai 2020, n° 18-21.692

Cass. 3e civ., 28 mai 2020, n° 19-13.586

CA Douai, 8e ch. sect. 3, 28 mai 2020, n° 19/03973

Cass. 3e civ., 28 mai 2020, n° 19-10.056

CA Douai, 2e ch. sect. 1, 28 mai 2020, n° 19/02671

Cass. 3e civ., 28 mai 2020, n° 19-15.001

Commission, May 28, 2020, No M.9447

Commission, May 28, 2020, No M.8955

Although proof of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position within the meaning of Regulation No 139/2004 may in certain cases constitute proof of a significant impediment to effective competition, that observation does not mean that the second criterion is the same in law as the first, but only that it may follow from one and the same factual analysis of a specific market that both criteria are satisfied. 

The standard of proof applicable in order to establish that there are non-coordinated effects on an oligopolistic market is not substantially different from that applicable in order to establish coordinated effects, but the more a theory of harm advanced in support of a significant impediment to effective competition put forward with regard to a concentration is complex or uncertain, or stems from a cause-and-effect relationship which is difficult to establish, the more demanding the Courts of the European Union must be as regards the specific examination of the evidence submitted by the Commission.

Although the Commission's Guidelines, as well as its previous practice, cannot, in any event, bind the EU Court, the General Court may in carrying out its task of interpreting EU law, adopt the guidance and the economic or legal assessments contained in them.

The mere effect of reducing competitive pressure on the remaining competitors is not, in principle, sufficient in itself to demonstrate a significant impediment to effective competition in the context of a theory of harm based on non-coordinated effects.

The merger must give rise to the elimination of the important competitive constraints that the merging parties had exerted upon each other, as well as a reduction of competitive pressure on the remaining competitors for, in application Article 2(3) of Regulation No 139/2004 interpreted in the light of recital 25 thereof, the  non-coordinated effects resulting from a concentration to be capable of leading, in certain circumstances, to a significant impediment to effective competition.

Article 2(3) of Regulation No 139/2004 allows the Commission to prohibit, in certain circumstances, on oligopolistic markets concentrations which, although not giving rise to the creation or strengthening of an individual or collective dominant position, are liable to affect the competitive conditions on the market to an extent equivalent to that attributable to such positions, by conferring on the merged entity the power to enable it to determine, by itself, the parameters of competition and, in particular, to become a price maker instead of remaining a price taker.

A significant impediment to effective competition within the meaning of Regulation No 139/2004 does not necessarily result from the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.

The Commission may declare a concentration incompatible with the internal market only if the significant impediment to effective competition is the direct and immediate effect of the concentration given that such an impediment, which would stem from future decisions by the merged entity, may only be regarded as a direct and immediate effect of the concentration, if that future conduct is made possible and economically rational by the alteration of the characteristics and the structure of the market caused by the concentration.

The competition analysis necessary in merger control requires, as a first step, an evaluation of the future conduct which the Commission contends will be engaged in by the merged entity and the other operators following the merger by means of the assessment of the economic outcome attributable to the concentration at issue which is most likely to ensue,  which is supplemented, as a second step, by an assessment, by means of a prospective analysis of the reference market, of whether that future conduct will probably lead to a situation in which effective competition in the relevant market is significantly impeded. 

Since the second stage of the analysis carried out by the Commission is the result of an assessment based on hypotheses, in the light of the economic outcome attributable to the concentration which is the most likely, it cannot be required that proof be adduced that the scenarios and theories of harm underpinning that assessment will inevitably occur although those scenarios and theories of harm must appear sufficiently realistic and plausible, and cannot therefore solely be conceivable from a theoretical point of view, in the light of an analysis of all the relevant factors.

The Commission may not find that a mere decline in the competitive pressure which would result, in particular, from the loss of an undertaking having more of an influence on competition than its market share would suggest, is sufficient, in itself, to prove a significant impediment to effective competition, insofar as this would amount to confusing three concepts, namely the concept of a "significant impediment to effective competition", which is the legal criterion referred to in Article 2(3) of Regulation No 139/2004, the concept of "elimination of [an] important competitive [constraint]", referred to in recital 25 of that regulation, and the concept of elimination of an "important competitive force", based on the Guidelines, and would considerably broaden the scope of Article 2(3) since any elimination of an important competitive force would amount to the elimination of an important competitive constraint which, in turn, would justify a finding of a significant impediment to effective competition.

The Commission made an error of law and an error of assessment in finding that an "important competitive force" does not need to stand out from its competitors in terms of impact on competition, particularly in so far as such a position would allow it to treat as an "important competitive force" any undertaking in an oligopolistic market exerting competitive pressure, which would allow the Commission to prohibit, by that fact alone, horizontal concentrations in such markets and would infringe the principle of legal certainty, since the Commission could thus omit to analyze the possible elimination of the important competitive constraints that the merging parties exert upon each other in favor of a theory of harm based solely on a reduction of competitive pressure on the remaining competitors.

The Commission cannot contend that the fact that an operator has a gross add share of new customers which is even limited in relation to its market share is still sufficient to make it an "important competitive force" when account is taken of the fact that it has continuously evolved on the relevant market insofar as, in comparison with the market shares described in the contested decision, a gross add share which could be quantified, in the situation which is most favorable to the Commission's view of between 10 and 20%, appears very low and is not comparable to the figures relating to new subscribers of the undertakings that the Commission classified as "important competitive forces" in its previous decisions.

The Commission made an error of assessment by concluding that the operator's gross add shares (share of new customers won) was a first indication that it exerted  a greater competitive constraint on the retail market than its market share would suggest.

 The mere growth in gross add shares over several consecutive years of the smallest mobile network operator in an oligopolistic market, which has in the past been classified as a "maverick" by the Commission and in the Statement of Objections in the present case, does not in itself constitute sufficient evidence of that operator's power on the market or of the elimination of the important competitive constraints that the parties to the concentration exert upon each other.

The Commission's reasoning which seems to imply that an undertaking which has historically played a disruptive role will necessarily play the same role in the future and cannot reposition itself on the market by adopting a different pricing policy, is vitiated by an error of assessment of the historic role played by that undertaking on the market, and in particular its value as evidence of a significant impediment to effective competition.

Even if the operators concerned are relatively close competitors in some of the segments of a concentrated market comprising four mobile network operators, that factor alone is not sufficient to prove, in the present case, the elimination of the important competitive constraints which the parties to the concentration exerted upon each other and cannot suffice to establish a significant impediment to effective competition as, if that were not the case, any concentration resulting in a reduction from four to three operators would as a matter of principle be prohibited.


While indicators of upward pressure on prices, such as the GUPPI or UPP tests, may be useful for screening purposes, by enabling the competition authorities to judge the need for a more thorough investigation, they must not be regarded as credible forecasts of price increases or simulations of mergers.

A UPP analysis will, in the absence of efficiencies, always predict some price increase from a horizontal merger that eliminates competition between the merging parties.

The fact that a network-sharing agreement may, when it is concluded, result in pro-competitive effects which counteract the restrictions it contains, does not necessarily mean that the termination, renegotiation, or that each subsequent alteration to its balance following a concentration may necessarily be characterized as a significant impediment to effective competition.

The Commission may not conclude that a lasting disruption to a network-sharing agreement would be likely to significantly impede competition exerted by the partner to such an arrangement as this would amount to prohibiting, as a matter of principle and on that basis alone, any concentration involving a reduction from four to three operators, when they are partners of the parties to the concentration in the network-sharing arrangements. 

It must be concluded that a possible misalignment of the interests of the partners in a network-sharing agreement, a disruption of the pre-existing network-sharing arrangements the duration of which was extended for the benefit of one of them or even the termination of those agreements does not constitute, in the present case, and as such, a significant impediment to effective competition in the context of a theory of harm based on non-coordinated effects.

Even though the Commission states in its Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers that the fact that competitors may be harmed because a merger creates efficiencies cannot in itself give rise to competition concerns, that reasoning is applicable by analogy in the context of a horizontal concentration, or even in the context of a tight oligopoly.

 Even if the merged entity had favored one of the two network-sharing agreements by, inter alia, providing it with an incentive to reduce the costs associated with the other network, this could not have a disproportionate effect on the other partner's competitive position or constitute a significant impediment to effective competition, since the Commission has not demonstrated the hypothesis that the other partner would have either the ability or the incentive to react following an increase in its costs and would simply stop investing in the network.



Whatever the network consolidation plan ultimately adopted by the parties to the concentration, they would not maintain two separate networks in the long term, where the analysis of the effects of a concentration on an oligopolistic market in the telecommunications sector, which requires long-term investment and where consumers are often tied by contracts over several years is a dynamic prospective analysis which requires account to be taken of any coordinated or unilateral effects over a relatively long period of time in the future, the Commission's proposition, relating to the effect on overall network investments of increased transparency, must therefore be rejected, insofar as it is based on the assumption of the existence of two separate networks.

Just as the existence of very large market shares is highly important and the relationship between the market shares of the parties involved in the concentration and those of their competitors is relevant evidence of the existence of a dominant position or of a significant impediment to effective competition, in that it enables the competitive strength of the competitors of the undertaking in question to be assessed, a particularly small market share of one of the parties involved in the concentration tends to suggest, prima facie, an absence of any significant impediment to effective competition, especially where the other operators have much larger market shares.

The mere fact that the gross share of new customers of one of the parties to the merger is higher than its market share is not sufficient, in the present case, to classify it as an "important competitive force" or establish a significant impediment to effective competition, in a context where its market share is, in actual fact, very small where even its gross  share of new clients, on a market with only four operators, is limited, even though those factors permit the inference that it has the ability to compete with the other players in the wholesale market, that it is a credible competitor and has an influence on competition, even when it does not win bids, and that it strengthened its position on the market.

GC, 1st chamber, extended composition, May 28, 2020, No T-399/16

Lorsque les clauses de la convention ont fait l'objet de discussions approfondies entre les parties, l'existence d'une soumission est exclue.

Les modalités d'application par les parties de la clause de rémunération du mandataire, qui concernent l'exécution de la convention de mandat, ne relèvent pas de l'appréciation d'un déséquilibre significatif.

Une clause d'exclusivité qui n'empêche pas le mandataire d'exercer d'autres activités que celles prévues au contrat en tant qu'intermédiaire en opérations de banque, ne permet pas d'établir un lien de dépendance vis-à-vis du mandant, qui s'apprécie à travers un examen global de l'activité.

L'activité du mandataire postérieure à l'expiration du contrat est indifférente pour déterminer la durée du préavis.

Lorsque le contrat n'a pas été exécuté de manière loyale par le mandant, l'indemnité de préavis est calculée en tenant compte du flux d'affaires qui aurait pu être réalisé en cas d'exécution loyale, sur la base des deux meilleures années complètes précédant la résiliation du contrat.

Les parties sont des partenaires en ce qu'elles entretiennent des relations dans le but de poursuivre une activité de services avec la volonté réciproque d'effectuer des actes dans le cadre d'un projet commun.

Le déséquilibre significatif doit être examiné au regard de l'analyse des clauses imposées dans la convention en tenant compte des contreparties accordées et de l'équilibre économique de l'opération.

CA Paris, Pôle 5 ch. 5, 28 mai 2020, n° 17-14603

CA Paris, Pôle 5 ch. 5, 28 mai 2020, n° 17-22223

CA Paris, Pôle 5 ch. 5, 28 mai 2020, n° 17-06606

Même si dans le secteur des assurances, les relations sont dépendantes des déclarations de sinistre des assurés, elles n'en présentent pas moins un caractère établi lorsqu'elles ont duré près de deux ans et ont donné lieu à un flux conséquent de missions. 

La nette diminution du volume des missions confiées à un prestataire ne caractérise qu'une rupture partielle lorsque les relations se sont poursuivies. 

Le chiffre d'affaires réalisé au cours d'une année exceptionnelle ne peut servir de référence pour apprécier l'existence d'une rupture partielle au cours de l'année suivante. 

Un prestataire qui n'est lié à son partenaire par aucune exclusivité peut néanmoins être reconnu dépendant de ce dernier lorsqu'il réalise 82 % de son chiffre d'affaires avec lui et que la nature de la relation exige qu'il s'organise pour répondre aux sollicitations de son client dans les délais les plus brefs. 

Le client qui accorde un préavis d'une année à son prestataire, mais réduit très sensiblement le volume des commandes au cours de cette période rompt brutalement les relations établies.

Des relations d'un peu plus de cinq mois qui n'ont généré qu'un chiffre d'affaires de 37 220 euro ne présentent pas de caractère établi.

CA Paris, Pôle 5 ch. 5, 28 mai 2020, n° 17-18641

Les modifications dans la structure des entités juridiques qui ont successivement constitué la personne du fournisseur ne remettent pas en cause la continuité de la relation lorsque le dernier contrat conclu entre les parties mentionne une antériorité de 25 ans. 

CA Paris, Pôle 5 ch. 5, 28 mai 2020, n° 17-03955

Le prestataire informé du lancement d'un appel d'offres pour l'activité en cause a connaissance du caractère désormais précaire de la relation.

Le prestataire, qui, à la suite d'un appel d'offres, signe un contrat à terme fixe d'une année renouvelable au maximum trois fois, a connaissance du caractère précaire de la relation.

Le fait qu'à la suite de l'annonce de la rupture, le prestataire ait tenté de proposer de nouvelles conditions pour obtenir le renouvellement du contrat, que le client a refusé, ne traduit pas un déséquilibre significatif dans la relation, dès lors qu'une telle situation relève de la liberté de négociation et non de l'exécution du contrat.

Un partenaire ne peut faire valoir le déséquilibre de l'obligation visée par une clause au regard de son absence de contrepartie dès lors que la lecture de la globalité de la convention établit que chaque clause participe d'une volonté d'assurer l'équiilibre de l'économie du contrat.

Décisions de justice rendues en 2020 - Page 45