Cass. 2e civ., 21 mars 2002, n° 00-20.744

Cass. 2e civ., 21 mars 2002, n° 00-19.051

Leasing constitutes a provision of service although it is characterized by the handing over of goods by the lessor to the lessee, insofar as the supply relates not so much to the goods themselves as to their use by the lessee, with the goods remaining the property of the lessor.

Road safety, which constitutes an overriding reason relating to public interest, cannot justify a roadworthiness testing obligation on the registration of a leased vehicle which has already undergone similar testing in another Member State.

Leasing constitutes a provision of service since the handing over of goods by the lessor to the lessee relates not so much to the goods themselves as to their use by the lessee, with the goods remaining the property of the lessor.

The obligation to register vehicles leased from an undertaking established in another Member State within three days in the Member State where they are used is disproportionate in relation to the objective aimed at facilitating controls and ensuring the payment of a tax relating to that type of vehicle, insofar as the time-limit is so short as to make virtually impossible to comply with it.

CJEC, 5th chamber, March 21, 2002, No C-451/99

La sécurité routière, raison impérieuse d'intérêt général, ne saurait justifier une obligation de contrôle technique à l'occasion de l'immatriculation d'un véhicule pris en leasing qui a déjà été soumis à un contrôle technique similaire dans un autre État membre.

Le leasing constitue une prestation de service car la fourniture ne porte pas tant sur les marchandises elles-mêmes, qui restent la propriété du bailleur, que sur leur utilisation par le locataire.

Le leasing constitue une prestation de services bien qu'il soit caractérisé par la remise de marchandises par le bailleur au locataire dès lors  que la fourniture porte sur l'utilisation par le locataire des marchandises, qui demeurent la propriété du bailleur.

L'obligation d'immatriculer dans un délai de trois jours dans l'État membre où ils sont utilisés les véhicules pris en leasing auprès d'une entreprise établie dans un autre État membre est disproportionnée par rapport à l'objectif visant à faciliter les contrôles et prouver le paiement d'une taxe relative à ce type de véhicule, dans la mesure où le délai prévu est si bref qu'il est quasiment impossible de le respecter.

CJCE, 5e ch., 21 mars 2002, n° C-451/99

Le fabricant qui livre un matériel en pièces détachées, devant être monté par un profane, est tenu de fournir à l'utilisateur tous les renseignements nécessaires à son usage, ainsi que de l'informer des contraintes techniques et précautions à prendre pour l'installation de la chose vendue.

En n'attirant pas l'attention de l'utilisateur sur la nécessité d'un décrassage du poêle litigieux tous les quinze jours, le fabricant vendeur a manqué à son obligation d'information accessoire à celle de délivrance.

CA Paris, 8e ch. D, 21 mars 2002, n° 2001-05616

A beer supply contract containing a non-compete obligation benefits from an individual exemption, when it brings about an improved distribution, which compensates for the price discrimination supported by the distributor.

Regulation No 1984/83 (currently replaced by Regulation No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010) does not apply to beer supply contracts which lay down a specification of the beer purchasing obligation by type of beer and not by brand or name, and therefore allow the brewer to unilaterally extend this obligation.

A beer supply contract containing exclusive and non-compete purchasing obligations benefits from an individual exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU, when it brings about an improved distribution, which compensates for the price discrimination supported by the distributor.

A beer supply contract, which includes exclusive purchase and non-compete obligations benefits from an individual exemption in light of Article 101(3) TFEU, if the result for users is an improvement in distribution, which compensates for the price discriminations suffered by the distributor.

The block exemption regulation does not apply to beer supply contracts which lay down a specification of the beer purchasing obligation by type of beer and not by brand or name, and therefore allow the brewer to unilaterally extend this obligation.

CFI, 3rd chamber, March 21, 2002, No T-231/99

A beer supply contract, which includes an exclusive purchase obligation benefits from an individual exemption, if the result is an improvement in distribution, which compensates for the price discriminations suffered by the distributor.

A beer supply contract, which includes non-compete obligations may benefit from an individual exemption, if the result is an improvement in distribution, which compensates for the price discriminations suffered by the distributor.

Regulation No 1984/83 (currently replaced by Regulation No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010) does not apply to beer supply contracts, which provides for a specification on the purchasing obligation by beer type, and not by brand or denomination, and therefore allows the brewer to unilaterally extend this obligation.

A beer supply contract, which includes non-compete obligations benefits from an individual exemption, if the result is an improvement in distribution, which compensates for the price discriminations suffered by the distributor.

Regulation No 1984/83 (now replaced by Regulation No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010) does not apply to beer supply contracts, which provides for a specification on the purchasing obligation by beer type, and not by brand or denomination, and therefore allows the brewer to unilaterally extend this obligation.

CFI, 3rd chamber, March 21, 2002, No T-131/99

Special tax credits initially granted under a previously authorized aid scheme constitute new aid when, as a result of the absorption of the recipients within a holding company to which the general tax consolidation system is applicable, the conditions for the grant of the credits set out in the decision approving the aid are no longer satisfied.

The Commission is not required to demonstrate the nature as State aid, within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, of aid authorized by derogating rules, such as shipbuilding aid, when it shows that the aid is no longer covered by those rules.

CJEC, 6th chamber, March 21, 2002, No C-36/00

La rupture à effet immédiat d'un partenariat limité à une période probatoire de sept mois, caractérisée par un faible volume de chiffre d'affaires, n'entre pas dans le champ d'application de l'article L. 442-1, II (ancien art. L. 442-6, I, 5°), du Code de commerce.

Des relations commerciales stables et régulières, poursuivies pendant deux années, n'ayant pas donné lieu à réclamations, ne peuvent être rompues brutalement, sans un préavis, qui en l'occurrence peut être fixé à trois mois.

CA Versailles, 12e ch. sect. 2, 21 mars 2002, n° 99-08593

La Commission n'a pas à démontrer la nature d'aide d'Etat, au sens de l'article 107, paragraphe 1, TFUE, d'une aide autorisée dans le cadre d'un régime dérogatoire, tel que celui des aides à la construction navale, lorsqu'elle constate que l'aide ne relève plus de ce régime.

Des crédits d'impôts spéciaux initialement octroyés en application d'un régime d'aides préalablement autorisé constituent des aides nouvelles lorsque, à la suite du passage des bénéficiaires sous le contrôle d'une holding à laquelle le régime général de consolidation fiscale est applicable, les conditions d'octroi des crédits prévues dans la décision d'approbation de ce régime ne sont plus réunies.

CJCE, 6e ch., 21 mars 2002, n° C-36/00

La conclusion d'un contrat portant sur la création d'un point vidéo-club par l'exploitante d'un commerce rural relève des dispositions du Code de la consommation sur le démarchage, dès lors que cette nouvelle activité est étrangère à la destination d'un tel commerce et concerne une activité professionnelle totalement distincte.

CA Caen, 1re ch. sect. civ. et com., 21 mars 2002, n° 00-02692

Un contrat de fourniture de bière contenant des obligations d'achat exclusif et de non-concurrence bénéficie d'une exemption individuelle en vertu de l'article 101, paragraphe 3, TFUE, si les améliorations de la distribution qu'il entraîne compensent les discriminations de prix supportées par le distributeur.

Le règlement d'exemption ne s'applique pas au contrat de fourniture de bière qui prévoit une spécification de l'obligation d'achat par type de bière, et non par la marque ou par la dénomination, et permet ainsi au brasseur d'étendre unilatéralement cette obligation.

Un contrat de fourniture de bière contenant des obligations de non-concurrence bénéficie d'une exemption individuelle si les améliorations de la distribution qu'il entraîne compensent les discriminations de prix supportées par le distributeur.

Le règlement n° 1984-83 (rempl. par le règl. n° 330-2010 du 20 avril 2010) ne s'applique pas au contrat de fourniture de bière qui prévoit une spécification de l'obligation d'achat par type de bière, et non par la marque ou par la dénomination, et permet ainsi au brasseur d'étendre unilatéralement cette obligation.

TPICE, 3e ch., 21 mars 2002, n° T-231/99

Un contrat de fourniture de bière contenant des obligations d'achat exclusif bénéficie d'une exemption individuelle si les améliorations de la distribution qu'il entraîne compensent les discriminations de prix supportées par le distributeur.

TPICE, 3e ch., 21 mars 2002, n° T-131/99

Le déréférencement partiel d'un fournisseur, sans préavis, engage la responsabilité de son auteur, en l'absence de faute établie de la victime.

CA Versailles, 12e ch. sect. 1, 21 mars 2002, n° 00-03079

Cass. 2e civ., 21 mars 2002, n° 00-18.832

Amending Regulation (EC) No 1555-96 on rules of application for additional import duties on fruit and vegetables

EC, March 20, 2002, No 498-2002

The role as the ringleader and instigator of the cartel and its bringing pressure on other undertakings to persuade them to enter the cartel are aggravating circumstances that justify increasing the basic fine by 50%.

The rights of defense are complied with when the Commission includes in the Statement of Objections the law and facts from which it will calculate the amount of the fine and, particularly, the special responsibility that the multinational undertaking must assume as the ringleader to the cartel.

The regrettable conduct of an official and member of the team dealing with the case who, through oral interventions, has discredited the activities of the applicant, does not violate the principle of sound administration and does not by itself vitiate the legality of the decision taken by the College of Commissioners.

The fact that the Commission has imposed, in the past, fines at a certain level to certain types of infringement does not prevent it from raising this level within the legal limits if it is necessary in order to ensure the implementation of EU competition policy.

The criteria for assessing the gravity of the infringement may include the volume and value of the goods in respect of which the infringement was committed, the size and economic power of the undertaking and, consequently, the influence which it was able to exert on the market.

CFI, 4th chamber, March 20, 2002, No T-31/99

Attributing the liability for a global agreement to an operator that did not directly participate in the unlawful conduct presupposes that it had knowledge of the other participant's unlawful conduct or that it could reasonably have foreseen it and was prepared to accept the risk.

The Commission can first determine the overall amount of the fine that will be imposed and, then, share this amount between the undertakings concerned, depending on their sector, role, importance on the market and the extent to which they participated in the infringement.

Amongst the factors of assessment of the gravity of the infringement, is the volume and value of goods in respect of which the infringement was committed, the size and economic power of the undertaking and, consequently, the influence which it was able to exert on the market.

Amongst the factors of assessment of the gravity of the infringement, depending on the case, is the volume and value of goods in respect of which the infringement was committed, the size and economic power of the undertaking and, consequently, the influence which it was able to exert on the market.

CFI, 4th chamber, March 20, 2002, No T-28/99

Presence at an initial meeting between competitors, then at a second meeting following the receipt of a letter mentioning a price list agreed on during a first meeting, is enough to amount to participation in a price cartel.

Its mere presence at meetings between competitors whose object is anticompetitive is enough to establish the participation of an undertaking in a cartel when it does not distance itself publicly from the content of those meetings.

An undertaking that participates in a single and complex infringement through its own conduct is also responsible for the boycotting operations in which it did not participate, but which were implemented as part of the same overall infringement, and where it was aware or should reasonably have been aware of the infringement and was prepared to accept that risk.

A valid Statement of Objections must contain evidence of the continuing and single nature of the overall infringement upheld by the Commission in its decision.

The Commission must indicate the time period upheld to determine the sanction on the basis of information available to it at the time the Statement of Objections was established.

The principle of the non-retroactivity of criminal provisions requires that sanctions imposed on an undertaking for an infringement are those available at the time the infringement was committed.

Its mere presence at meetings between competitors whose purpose is anticompetitive is enough to establish an undertaking's participation in a cartel when it does not distance itself publicly from the content of those meetings.

Presence at an initial meeting between competitors during which the situation of prices on the market was discussed and following which a price list was sent out, then at a second meeting following the receipt of a letter mentioning this price list, is enough to amount to participation in a price cartel.

CFI, 4th chamber, March 20, 2002, No T-21/99

An undertaking that participates in a single complex infringement through its own conduct is also responsible for a boycotting operation in which it has not effectively participated but which has been implemented by other undertakings within the framework of the same overall infringement.

A complex cartel of long duration, based on various concerted practices and agreements between competitors with a single, anticompetitive object, amounts to a single, continuous infringement which can be defined both under agreements and concerted practices.

The holding of meetings concerning the allocation of market shares between competitors in a given period proves the existence of an agreement on the principle of market allocation even if, finally, the negotiations failed.

When the imposition of a fine is expected, the Statement of Objections must indicate the main evidence of fact and law that may justify its amount, such as the gravity and duration of the infringement, and that establish that the infringement was committed deliberately or by negligence.

A period of more than one month from the Statement of Objections is sufficient for comments to be given.

The principle of equality of arms is honored when the undertakings have access to the original documents, even in their original language, when it is on these that the Commission has based its assessment.

The Commission is not obliged to summon defense witnesses, whose evidence is requested, for an oral hearing, and cannot summon prosecution witnesses without having obtained their agreement.

Although the statement of reasons of a decision must allow all the interested parties to know why a measure has been taken and allow a court to review it, the Commission need not list all the relevant facts and law.

In the absence of a legal person which, at the head of a group, could have been imputed for the infringements committed by the various component undertakings of the group, it is the latter that are jointly and severally responsible.

The principle that penal provisions may not have retroactive effect is not violated when the fine is imposed according to principles fixed by the Commission in its Guidelines for the application of the procedural regulation when they do not go further than the framework set by that text.

The Commission may first determine the overall amount of the fine, then divide it between the undertakings concerned according to various criteria.

Its mere presence at meetings between competitors, whose purpose is anticompetitive, is sufficient to prove the participation of an undertaking in a cartel when it has not distanced itself publicly from the content of those meetings.

A gentlemen's agreement can amount to an agreement within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU even though it is not binding in nature.

An undertaking cannot rely upon the fact that it participated under pressure from other participants at the meetings whose purpose was to fix prices and quotas in so far as it could have reported this pressure to the competent authorities.

The system of periodic meetings between competitors whose purpose is, notably, price fixing, and the co-ordination of price increases, is contrary to Article 101 TFEU.

CFI, 4th chamber, March 20, 2002, No T-9/99

Its mere presence at meetings between competitors with an anticompetitive object, is enough to establish an undertaking's participation in a cartel when it does not distance itself publicly from the content of those meetings.

An undertaking that participates in a complex infringement through its own conduct is also responsible for a boycotting operation in which it has not actually participated but which has been implemented by other undertakings within the framework of the same infringement.

A cartel involving several rival undertakings continuing over several years pursuing a single anticompetitive object, amounts to a complex infringement which may be classified both as an agreement and a concerted practice.

The presence of active competitors on the market at regular meetings over a long period gives rise to a simple presumption of participation in an illegal concerted practice.

A cartel involving several rival undertakings continuing over several years pursuing a single anticompetitive goal, amounts to a complex infringement which may be classified both as an agreement and a concerted practice.

The Commission has respected the undertaking's right to be heard, by expressly stating its intention to examine the necessity of imposing a fine and by setting out the main facts and law that may lead to such an imposition.

A time-limit of more than one month granted to allow replies to a Statement of Objections is sufficient, given the reduced number of documents, the relevance of which had been explained in the accompanying letter.

The Commission fulfils its obligation to allow access to the entire file when it suggests that the undertakings concerned exchange documents mutually while allowing access to the complete file on its premises.

The principle that penal provisions should not have retro-active effect means that the sanctions imposed on an undertaking for an infringement of competition rules should correspond to those set at the time that the infringement was committed.

The Commission is not obliged to explain in the Statement of Objections the manner in which it used the elements of law and fact adopted to determine the level of the fine.

Meetings with an anticompetitive object between competitors during which decisions are taken on prices, which are anticompetitive by their object, amount to practices contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU, even when no effective price increase followed.

An agreement may exist even if its content is not set and even if the parties did not agree on each of the details of their future behavior.

Its mere presence at meetings between competitors with an anticompetitive object,  is enough to establish an undertaking's participation in a cartel when it does not distance itself publicly from the content of those meetings.

The illegality of a concerted practice, which is anticompetitive by its object, does not require the disputed practices to produce an actual restrictive effect on competition.

It is legitimate to presume that undertakings participating in an information exchange and remaining active on the market, use that information, except where there is evidence to the contrary.

It is a legitimate to presume that undertakings participating in an information exchange and remaining active on the market, use that information, except where there is evidence to the contrary.

CFI, 4th chamber, March 20, 2002, No T-16/99

An undertaking that participates in a single and complex infringement by its own conduct is also responsible for a boycotting operation in which it has not actually participated but which has been implemented by undertakings within the framework of the same overall cartel in so far as it knew or should reasonably have known of it and was ready to accept the risks.

When the Commission includes in its Statement of Objections the facts and law which it had used in calculating the fine, the undertakings' right to be heard has been honored.

The principle that criminal provisions cannot have a retro-active effect is not breached when the fine is imposed according to principles laid out by the Commission in its Guidelines for the application of the procedural regulation when these do not go further than the framework set by the text.

The fact that the Commission had imposed, in the past, fines at a certain level to certain types of infringement does not prevent it from raising this level if it is necessary to ensure the implementation of the EU competition policy.

CFI, 4th chamber, March 20, 2002, No T-15/99

An undertaking that participates in a single and complex infringement by its own conduct is also responsible for a boycotting operation in which it has not actually participated but which has been implemented by other undertakings as part of the same overall infringement.

The Commission can facilitate access to the investigation file by suggesting the undertakings concerned to exchange, between themselves, the documents obtained from each of them, as long as the undertakings retain the right to access the entirety of the investigation file with the exception of documents containing business secrets, confidential information and internal Commission documents, on its premises.

The dispatch, subsequent to that of the Statement of Objections, of new documents that do not introduce new objections, but which refer to those already notified of, does not breach the rights of defense when the applicant has enough time to submit its comments.

Although the Commission must state the elements of fact and law on which it based its fine calculations, it is not required to explain the manner in which it will use each of those elements to determine the fine in the Statement of Objections.

The principle that a penal provision cannot have retro-active effect is not breached when the fine is imposed according to the principles laid down by the Commission in its Guidelines on applying the procedural Regulation, when they do not do further than the framework set by that text.

Concerning the determination of the amount of fines, the General Court has unlimited jurisdiction and may, in particular, cancel or reduce the fine.

The holding of meetings between competitors, concerning the allocation of market shares in a given period, proves the existence of an agreement on the principle of market allocation even if, finally, the negotiations failed.

The presence at an initial meeting between competitors during which the price situation on the market was discussed and after which a uniform price list was circulated, then at a second meeting following the receipt of a letter of invitation mentioning that price list, is enough to show participation in a price cartel.

An undertaking cannot rely upon the fact that it participated under pressure from the other participants in meetings whose purpose was to fix prices and quotas in so far as it could have reported that pressure to the competent authority.

CFI, 4th chamber, March 20, 2002, No T-23/99

An undertaking that participates in a single complex infringement by its own conduct is also liable for market-sharing agreements in which it did not participate, when they are implemented within the same context as the overall infringement and when the undertaking knew the risks or could reasonably predict them and went ahead regardless.

An undertaking that participates in a single complex infringement by its own conduct is also liable for market-sharing agreements in which it did not participate, when they are implemented within the same context as the overall infringement and when the undertaking knew the risks or could reasonable predict them and went ahead regardless.

It is not necessary to demonstrate that the individual participation of each undertaking affects trade between Member States in order to apply Article 101 TFEU.

The principle of the non-retroactivity of criminal measures is not breached if the fine is imposed in conformance with the principles derived by the Commission in its guidelines for the application of the procedural regulation, as long as these guidelines do not go beyond the framework of the regulation.

The fact that the Commission applied fines of a certain amount for certain types of infringements in the past does not prevent it from increasing that amount within the legal limit if this is necessary to ensure the enforcement of EU competition policies.

First, the Commission determines the overall amount of the fines to be paid, then it apportions the total between the undertakings concerned, depending on the activity in the industry concerned, the degree of participation in the infringement, the role played in the restrictive agreement and their respective sizes on the market.

In order to give each undertaking an opportunity to present its views on the criteria used to determine the amount of the fines, the Statement of Objections must contain an explanation of the duration, gravity, and the anticompetitive nature of the challenged facts.

An undertaking cannot claim that it participated in meetings that were intended to fix prices and quotas under the duress of other, economically more powerful parties, as it could have denounced this pressure to the proper authorities.

CFI, 4th chamber, March 20, 2002, No T-17/99

Acquiring an interest in an undertaking active on a market open to competition can justify the application of Article 102 TFEU only where the funds used by the undertaking holding the monopoly on a reserved market derive from abuses of a dominant position on this market.

CFI, 4th chamber, March 20, 2002, No T-175/99

La reproduction servile et la commercialisation à un prix inférieur de l'œuvre d'autrui ne constituent pas des faits de concurrence déloyale distincts de la contrefaçon, mais peuvent aggraver le préjudice causé par celle-ci.

CA Paris, 4e ch. A, 20 mars 2002, n° 2000-07437

Le repreneur d'un fonds de commerce anciennement exploité en location-gérance est tenu de poursuivre les contrats de travail des salariés licenciés sans cause réelle et sérieuse avant l'expiration du contrat de location-gérance.

Cass. soc., 20 mars 2002, n° 00-41.651

En dépit du respect du préavis contractuel, la résiliation d'un contrat de distribution est déloyale lorsque  le concédant l'annonce par voie de presse, dans des conditions plaçant le concessionnaire en position d'infériorité vis-à-vis du repreneur qu'il lui a présenté, et n'intervient pas pour aboutir à une solution équitable.

En dépit du respect du préavis contractuel, la résiliation d'un contrat de distribution est déloyale lorsqu'elle intervient après que le concédant ait laissé espérer la continuité des relations et ait annoncé par voie de presse, dans des conditions plaçant le concessionnaire en position d'infériorité vis-à-vis du repreneur présenté par le concédant, et sans que celui-ci intervienne pour aboutir à une solution équitable.

En dépit du respect du préavis contractuel, la résiliation d'un contrat de distribution est déloyale lorsqu'elle intervient après que le concédant ait laissé espérer la continuité des relations et est annoncée par voie de presse, dans des conditions plaçant le concessionnaire en position d'infériorité vis-à-vis du repreneur présenté par le concédant, et sans que celui-ci intervienne pour aboutir à une solution équitable.

En dépit du respect du préavis contractuel, la résiliation d'un contrat de distribution est déloyale lorsqu'elle intervient après que le concédant ait laissé espérer la continuité des relations.

CA Paris, 5e ch. A, 20 mars 2002, n° 2000-01095

L'acquisition d'une participation dans une entreprise active sur un marché ouvert à la concurrence, par une entreprise disposant d'un monopole sur un marché réservé, n'est visée par l'article 102 TFUE que si les fonds utilisés trouvent leur source dans des abus de position dominante commis sur le marché réservé.

TPICE, 4e ch. élargie, 20 mars 2002, n° T-175/99

Un gentlemen's agreement peut constituer un accord au sens de l'article 101 TFUE bien qu'il soit dépourvu de caractère obligatoire.

La seule présence à des réunions entre concurrents ayant un objet anticoncurrentiel suffit à établir la participation d'une entreprise à l'entente dès lors qu'elle ne se distancie pas publiquement du contenu de ces réunions.

Une entreprise ne peut se prévaloir du fait qu'elle participait sous la contrainte des autres intervenants à des réunions ayant pour objet la fixation de prix et de quotas dans la mesure où elle pouvait dénoncer ces pressions aux autorités compétentes.

Un Gentlemen's agreement peut constituer un accord au sens de l'article 101 TFUE bien qu'il soit dépourvu de caractère obligatoire.

La poursuite de réunions entre concurrents relatives à l'attribution de parts de marché sur une période donnée permet de conclure à l'existence d'un accord sur le principe d'une répartition de marché même si les négociations ont finalement échoué.

Une entente complexe et durable fondée sur une série de pratiques concertées et d'accords entre concurrents caractérisés par une seule finalité anticoncurrentielle constitue une infraction unique et continue qui peut relever simultanément de l'accord et de la pratique concertée.

Un système de réunions périodiques entre producteurs concurrents ayant notamment pour objet la fixation des prix du produit et de chaque projet et une coordination des augmentations des prix bruts, est contraire à l'article 101 TFUE.

Lorsque le prononcé d'une amende est expressément envisagé, la communication des griefs doit indiquer les principaux éléments de fait et de droit susceptibles de justifier son montant, tels que la gravité et la durée de l'infraction, et établir que l'infraction a été commise de propos délibéré ou par négligence.

Un délai de plus d'un mois est suffisant pour la présentation d'observations à la communication de griefs.

Le principe d'égalité des armes est respecté lorsque les entreprises ont accès aux documents originaux même rédigés dans leur langue d'origine, dès lors qu'il s'agit de ceux sur lesquels la Commission a fondé son appréciation.

La Commission n'a pas l'obligation de convoquer à l'audition orale des témoins à décharge dont le témoignage est demandé, et ne peut convoquer des témoins à charge sans avoir obtenu leur accord.

Si la motivation de la décision doit permettre aux intéressés de connaître les justifications de la mesure prise et au juge d'exercer son contrôle, la Commission n'est pas tenue de spécifier tous les éléments de fait et de droit pertinents.

En l'absence d'une personne juridique qui, à la tête du groupe, aurait pu se voir imputer les infractions commises par les diverses sociétés composantes, ce sont ces dernières qui en sont solidairement responsables.

Une entreprise qui a participé à une infraction unique et complexe par des comportements qui lui sont propres est aussi responsable d'une opération de boycottage à laquelle elle n'a pas participé effectivement mais qui a été mise en uvre par d'autres entreprises dans le cadre de la même infraction globale.

Le principe de non-rétroactivité des dispositions pénales n'est pas violé lorsque l'amende est infligée conformément aux principes dégagés par la Commission dans ses Lignes directrices pour l'application du règlement procédure, dès lors que celles-ci ne vont pas au-delà du cadre fixé par ce texte.

La Commission est en droit de déterminer d'abord le montant global de l'amende puis de le répartir entre les entreprises concernées selon divers critères.

Décisions de justice rendues en 2002 - Page 56